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ABSTRACT
This quantitative study aimed to determine if traffic stops and self-initiated activities for first-line
patrol officers, from a large police agency in the Southern United States, decreased after bodyworn cameras (BWCs) were issued. Additionally, this study attempted to determine if there was
an effect on the crime rate after the cameras were issued. Body-worn cameras have been
considered as a device to improve police-citizen relationships. While numerous studies find the
cameras useful; some drawbacks regarding the BWCs are beginning to surface. The importance
of this study will allow department leaders to make certain that body-worn cameras are adding
value and not hindering police performance, as many cities are seeing an uptick in violent crime.
The purpose of the study was to determine if officer proactive initiatives declined over time after
the BWCs were issued and if this influenced the crime rate. A quantitative analysis using
archived data was utilized. The sample consisted of 1,455 first-line patrol officers who worked in
a patrol capacity for April-June 2014, 2017, and 2019. The data collected from 2014 was prior to
BWCs while the data retrieved in 2017 and 2019 was post BWCs. The study indicated traffic
stops and self-initiated activity significantly decreased after BWCs were issued. This contrasts
with other studies that have analyzed traffic stops and self-initiated activities specifically.
Recommendations for future research include evaluating agencies of equal size for
generalizability and conducting a qualitative analysis using officers from this sample to
determine precisely why proactive initiatives have decreased significantly.
Keywords: body-worn cameras (BWCs), traffic stops, self-initiated activity, deterrence
theory, self-awareness theory, social learning theory, career-stage theory
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Overview
Body-worn cameras (BWCs) have become a primary tool for patrol officers across many
police agencies in the United States and is considered one of the fastest upgrades in police
technology (Schneider, 2018). However, technology can have its drawbacks. This study seeks to
examine if BWCs are causing police officers to be reluctant when initiating proactive initiatives
such as traffic stops and self-initiated activities, a practice that can avert crime and enhance
public safety (Fliss et al., 2020). This chapter will discuss how BWCs came about, the
importance of proactive initiatives to society, and a historical lookback into issues involving the
police, thus the acquisition of BWCs. Inquiry into four theoretical frameworks will guide the
research and aim at determining if there a correlation between police proactive initiatives and the
crime rate. Problems surrounding the BWCs, and officer proactive initiatives are addressed. The
purpose of the study and its significance are also discussed.
Background
Since 2014, the police profession has been under close examination after numerous
officer-involved shooting (OIS) deaths; some considered unwarranted and inexcusable by the
public. The August 9, 2014, shooting death of Michael Brown, in Ferguson, Missouri, was a
turning point for many police agencies across the nation and one that launched rapid police
reform according to Crow and Smykla (2019) and Lum et al. (2019). The OIS involving Michael
Brown and many other OIS incidents, in 2014, emitted a call to action that was so loud President
Barack Obama developed a task force (President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015).
In December 2014, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing was taxed with
evaluating and considering current police practices and determining what improvements could be
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made. As a result, the task force overwhelmingly supported and promptly implemented tools to
reduce OIS encounters and other excessive force claims. President Obama agreed with the task
force when they suggested BWCs would help alleviate police misconduct and improve trust
between the police and the communities they serve. The expectation is that the BWCs would be
instrumental in the solution to improve officer behavior and police-community relationships
(Ariel et al., 2016; Bromberg et al., 2018). Ariel et al. further commented that President Obama
allotted millions of dollars to fund BWCs for police agencies across the nation. Citizens,
politicians, and other stakeholders believed the cameras would lessen the likelihood of officers
using unnecessary excessive force, therefore improving police officer accountability and citizen
safety (Taylor et al., 2017). There was also a belief that the cameras would alter the officer’s
behavior as well as the citizen’s behavior for a more positive police-citizen interaction (Ariel et
al., 2021). However, the camera does not come without some disadvantages.
Numerous studies have been conducted since the implementation of BWCs. Some studies
have revealed positive outcomes, such as less use of force complaints, while others have found
no change in officer behavior, officer attitude, citizen behavior, and community attitudes (Lum et
al., 2019). However, what is alarming is that the BWCs have produced some unintended
consequences that are having devastating effects on communities and even police officers (Lum
et al., 2017; Wright & Headley, 2021). The BWCs may be precluding police officers from
carrying out proactive initiatives, which some studies show to be a crime reducing agent, because
officers fear discipline, indictment, and even death (Rosenfeld & Wallman, 2019). This study
seeks to discover if there is a reduction in officer proactive initiatives after BWCs were issued.
Additionally, this study will strive to determine if there is a correlation to proactive initiatives
and the crime rate.
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Society-at-Large
Police have used proactive initiatives, such as hot spot policing, broken windows
policing, traffic stops, and the stop-question-frisk tactic as hard-hitting approaches addressing
low-level crimes to avert the spawning of more serious and violent crimes (Schuck, 2020). Crime
is not uniformly diffused across communities, rather there are areas that are a magnet for crime
which can produce half of all criminal events in a specified area (Braga et al., 2019). Hot spot
initiatives involve flooding high crime areas with police officers who self-initiate contact with
citizens (Weisburd et al., 2017). These authors proclaim there is strong evidence to validate that
hot spot policing is successful without shifting crime to other areas of the community.
Broken windows policing has been used historically as another means to subdue more
serious crimes given that broken windows policing addresses quality of life disorder and decay
within communities (Cohen, 2019). He further expands on this matter and asserts quality of life
issues include abandoned or deteriorating structures and buildings, and low-level violations such
as loitering and urinating in public; all signs that residents are uncaring or unable to maintain
their neighborhoods on their own. He also espouses that failure to address such issues invites
more ruthless and violent criminals that can cause a neighborhood to spiral out of control.
Traditionally, traffic stops have served as a tactic to curb serious or dangerous crimes and
are the most common engagement between officers and citizens (Chenane et al., 2020). Traffic
stops prevent drunk driving, automobile crashes that are a result of speeding or running redlights, the trafficking of drugs and people, reckless driving, road-rage, and many other crimes.
Research confirms that “traffic stops promote public safety by reducing dangerous driving
practices and non-vehicular crimes” (Fliss et al., 2020, p. 2).
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For decades, the stop-question-frisk tactic has been a police practice that is supported by
the United States Supreme Court case, Terry v. Ohio (Browning & Arrigo, 2021). These authors
explain this tactic allows police officers to approach, detain, and pat-down a person they
reasonably suspect of being involved in a crime, about to commit a crime, or may be of a danger
to others. They further mention that supporters of this tactic espouse this reduces and prevents
crime. However, Browning and Arrigo also state those who oppose the tactic do so because they
believe minority individuals are targeted and the approach, overall, is futile. Recognizing
specific groups disapprove of this tactic, combined with the current climate surrounding officerinvolved shootings, that comprise a greater part of minorities, further hampers police initiatives
that can reduce crime (Chenane et al., 2020). These authors discovered that almost 90% of police
officers questioned, in a recent survey, credit the recorded high-profile shooting incidents
between police and African American citizens as the chief reason their jobs more difficult,
dangerous, and a primary reason for pulling back on enforcement activity.
Historical Overview
High-profile police incidents are nothing new and they have, by and large, involved
social injustices (Todak & James, 2018). If fact, Embrick (2015) states that President Lyndon B.
Johnson formed the National Advisory Committee on Civil Disorders (NACCD) in 1968 to
assess the riots that stemmed from police brutality in the 1960s. He declared the committee
generated the Kerner Report, named after Illinois Governor Otto Kerner, Jr., who chaired the
NACCD. The NACCD was tasked with uncovering what happened during the riots, what
instigated the riots, and what could be done to prevent such an occurrence in the future (Farley,
2018). Almost fifty years later, Todak and James assert that citizens are still legitimately
concerned about how police conduct their duties and how it has become a profound issue
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affecting today’s society. It was not until the 2014 shooting death of Michael Brown did police
agencies overwhelmingly respond by implementing BWCs, for improved transparency and
officer accountability, after President Obama facilitated the distribution of thousands of BWCs to
police agencies around the country (Ariel et al., 2016; Bromberg et al., 2018; Office of the Press
Secretary, 2014). However, since the implementation of BWCs, crime rates have been increasing
and some scholars suggest this is in part to officers decreasing proactive initiatives which has
been dubbed the “Ferguson Effect” (MacDonald, 2019). The “Ferguson Effect” will be discussed
in more detail in the subsequent chapter.
Theoretical Framework
Several theories will be used to guide the research to determine if there is a correlation
between BWCs, officer proactive initiatives, and the crime rate. Since 1993, the nation’s crime
rate steadily decreased for more than two decades, however, the rate has begun to rise once again
(Morgan & Oudekerk, 2019). These authors believe this uptick in crime began shortly after the
OIS death of Michael Brown along with the implementation of BWCs. This study will consider
four different theories in which to determine if BWCs are deterring officers from conducting
proactive initiatives. The first theory is the deterrence theory. The BWCs are grounded on the
deterrence theory, which aims at deterring what society considers socially unacceptable behavior
(Ariel et al., 2017). Are officers fearful that footage from the BWCs may be misconstrued or
perceived socially unacceptable, therefore, less traffic stops are conducted to avoid citizen
contact?
The second theory to be examined is the learning theory. The learning theory espouses
individuals will alter their conduct according to what happens to others and therefore, will avoid
certain activities based on the consequences the actions have provoked in the past (Mayes, 2015).
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MacDonald (2019) believes the heightened media scrutiny is causing officers to think twice
before proactively engaging with people on the street. The third theory being assessed is the selfawareness theory. The self-awareness theory is closely associated to the deterrence theory and
the learning theory. The self-awareness theory claims that as individuals recognize they are
being observed they will often modify their behavior to align with social norms to escape
negative repercussions (Groff et al., 2020; Hughes et al., 2020). Some studies assert the watchful
eye of the BWCs are causing officers to burnout at a faster rate due to the public image they feel
they must portray for the camera, thus contributing to the decrease in proactive initiatives
(Schaible & Six, 2016). Others maintain that officers are avoiding proactive initiatives as a way
to preserve their career (Shjarback et al., 2017). Which brings the researcher to the final theory,
the career-stage theory. The career-stage theory posits that activity levels naturally decline
throughout a person’s career which may support the explanation as to why some officers curtail
their proactive initiatives as their career progresses over time (Bonkiewicz, 2017).
To summarize, police BWCs have emerged rapidly across the United States in the last
several years without much definitive research or consistent results (Bromberg et al., 2018; Lum
et al., 2019). In addition, many cities are experiencing a rise in crime (Hyland, 2018; Wallace et
al., 2018; Wolfe & Nix, 2016). While it is premature to assume that BWCs are causing crime
rates to climb, they may be a contributing factor should it be determined that officers are
curtailing their proactive initiatives. Therefore, analyzing proactive initiatives (traffic stops and
self-initiated activities) before and after the deployment of BWCs may provide insight that
would enable police agencies to develop policies and best practices that would contribute to
improving officer-community relations, thus decreasing crime.
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Problem Statement
Many police agencies across the country have adopted BWCs and according to media
reports, numerous polls infer the public is in support of the cameras (Bromberg et al., 2018).
Bromberg and associates also point out there is more coverage from the media regarding BWCs
than research, thus the media controls the narrative of what is expected of the BWCs. They
further noted the Rialto study, the first controlled experiment analyzing BWCs and officer use of
force, was not only the first peer reviewed study, but one that triumphed with positive results.
These authors believe that because of these encouraging results, the Rialto study has been
extensively defended by the media claiming BWCs are a valuable and beneficial tool for police
officers. However, they believe this study to be biased given that Rialto’s Chief of Police,
William Farrar, co-authored the study; something that is rarely publicized. Shjarback et al.
(2017) defends the claim regarding media hype and goes on to state that experimental research
has been unable to keep pace with the allegations that officers curtail proactive initiatives
following negative law enforcement incidents. Shjarback and colleagues assert much more
research examining BWCs and proactive initiatives is needed.
Numerous officer-involved shooting incidents involving unarmed minorities in recent
years has shattered trust between police and citizens. The main premise surrounding BWCs is to
provide the public with transparency so that trust can be mended (President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing, 2015). Meijer (2013) defines transparency as “the availability of information
about an actor that allows other actors to monitor the workings or performance of the first actor”
(p. 430). The BWCs are supposed to facilitate this transparency. However, Bromberg et al.
(2018) suggests transparency by way of the camera may be hindering trust and contributing to a
whole host of other issues that include privacy issues for victims and lack of officer discretion.
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Additionally, officers who were equipped with a camera were more likely to be assaulted than
those who did not wear one (Ariel et al., 2016). The same study by these authors revealed that
the officers who were wearing the BWCs we just as likely to use force than those who did not,
yet this is what the camera was expected to reduce. Furthermore, since the deployment of BWCs
crime rates have increased across numerous cities leaving some to wonder if the increase in
crime is due to a decrease in proactive initiatives and the intense media scrutiny that policing has
endured in recent years (Hyland, 2018; Wallace et al., 2018).
A major push in police reform is for officers to be more proactive and prevent crime
before it happens (Lum et al., 2020). Traffics stops are just one of many proactive-initiatives
officers utilize to avert crashes and crime, thus enhancing public safety. Studies that have
analyzed whether or not BWCs promote the decrease of self-initiated activities are not
conclusive (Lum et al., 2019). In fact, Lum et al. uncovered only six recent studies that addressed
officer proactivity including traffic stops, while other studies focus mainly on officer use of
force, citizen complaints, and public opinion of the cameras. In conclusion, the studies analyzing
officer proactivity were found to have inconsistent results. The authors indicated that differing
methodologies and the type of proactive initiatives assessed contributed to mixed results.
However, a study conducted by Shjarback et al. (2017) found that traffic stops throughout the
state of Missouri declined significantly in 2015, in comparison to 2014, following the highprofile shooting deaths of Michael Brown and others. Shjarback and colleagues credit this
decline to officers conducting more quality traffic stops, although it was not specified in this
study if officers were equipped with BWCs. Lum et al. recommends future researchers steer
clear of focusing on universal activity increases and decreases and narrow down to the focus to
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specific proactive initiatives to determine the effects, if any, the BWCs have on these proactive
initiatives.
Lum et al. (2019) suggest some proactive initiatives can be beneficial in reducing crime
and improving community relations while other proactive initiatives may be futile and hamper
community relations. They believe many studies have grouped proactive initiatives together so
no one initiative has been studied in depth, which is problematic. They recommend that future
studies target specific officer initiated activities instead of merging all proactive initiatives
together. They believe this will offer a better understanding as to why some initiatives have
decreased, some have increased, and the impact each initiative may have on communities. This
study aims to examine specific officer proactive initiatives before and after the implementation
of BWCs to determine if the BWCs are having an impact on officer’s willingness to engage with
citizens.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study is to determine if officer proactive initiatives (traffic stops and
self-initiated activities) have declined since the deployment of BWCs using archived data from a
large, metropolitan police agency in the Southern United States that services more than one
million citizens. Additionally, the study will attempt to determine if there is a correlation
between officer proactive initiatives and the crime rate. A quantitative study was chosen to
determine if officers are curtailing proactive initiatives subsequent to being equipped with BWCs
and if this curtailment is having a negative impact on the crime rate. As previously mentioned,
there has not been enough research conducted to determine if BWCs are a factor for officers
contemplating traffic enforcement and self-initiated citizen contacts. Furthermore, the researcher
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was unable to locate a study that employed archived data. This study will contribute to the body
of knowledge and narrow the gap.
Archived data from the partcipating police agency will be used to determine if BWCs are
contributing to a reduction in traffic stops and officer self-initiated activities, thus its impact on
the crime rate. The number of traffic stops conducted by each officer will be collected prior and
subsequent to the deployment of BWCs using three points in time totalling nine months of data.
Additionally, the officer’s years of service with the department at the time the data is collected
will be factored to determine if the career-stage theory is plausible. Furthermore, crime rates
recorded by the participating police agency for the corresponding city will be collected to
determine if there is a correlation to the number of proactive initiatives and crimes committed.
Significance of the Study
The lack of research and the mixed results from previous studies indicate that additional
studies are critical for stakeholders to understand the full impact BWCs have on crime. The
group of studies analyzing police officer behavior by Lum et al. (2019) vary across the board
with most failing to focus directly on traffic stops and self-initiated activities before and after
BWCs. Furthermore, they admit that many of the studies take place in locations housing 250,000
residents or less. The study by Shjarback et al. (2017), had more definitive results as they studied
more than 100 police agencies across the state of Missouri where the 2014 OIS death of Michael
Brown occurred. They found a significant reduction in the number of traffic stops after the highprofile OIS death of Michael Brown. However, they failed to indicate if BWCs had been issued
to the officers during the study. This current research will focus entirely on archived data
pertaining specifically to traffic stops and officer self-initiated activities before and after the
deployment of BWCs and the impact the proactive initiatives may have on the crime rate.
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Inquiry into this research will provide a better understanding as to whether the BWCs are
doing more harm to communities than good. The BWCs were rolled out without much
examination when they were pushed out by President Obama and then further supported by the
Trump administration (Smith, 2019). He asserts that BWCs are not the technical solution the
public had hoped, and that some police agencies have underlying issues a camera cannot fix.
Utilizing the four aforementioned theories, this research hopes to provide a more thorough
insight into BWCs and their impact on crime rates.
This study will allow police agencies to achieve a better understanding of how the the
BWCs affect their agency and the citizens they serve. Moreover, it will allow agencies to
develop policies that are beneficial to all concerned as the cameras have been found to have
some drawbacks. Adams and Mastracci (2019) found that BWCs contribute to officer burnout.
Furthermore, a study conducted by Bierie (2017) showed officers were hesitant in taking
necessary action out of fear of how they would be perceived on camera. More studies are
warranted as the current police climate is tumultuous and the BWCs may not be meeting the
desired expectations in some cities.
Research Questions
RQ1: What is the difference in the number of traffic stops after BWCs were deployed?
RQ2: What is the difference in the number of self-initiated activities after BWCs were deployed?
RQ3: What is the relationship between traffic stops and the Part I crime rate before and after
BWCs were deployed?
RQ4: What is the relationship between officer self-initiated activities and the Part I crime rate
before and after BWCs were deployed?
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RQ5: What is the relationship between the number of officer proactive initiatives and their
career progression?
Definitions
1. Body-worn camera (BWC) – a small apparatus that affixes to the front of a police
officer’s uniform to record sound and video (Schneider, 2018).
2. Crisis Intervention Training – training for police officers to help recogize and give aid to
those suffering from a mental health crisis (Robinson, 2020).
3. “Ferguson Effect” – when police officers intentionally reduce their proactive initiatives
potentially causing crime rates to increase (MacDonald, 2019).
4. Officer-involved shooting (OIS) – when an officer discharges their firearm at a person
(Etheridge & Gibson, 2020). OIS in this paper implies a fatal shooting.
5. Part I crimes – crimes deemed as the most serious and frequently committed in the
United States by the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reporting Program,
therefore, they are the crimes most likely to be reported to law enforcement (U.S.
Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010).
6. Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) – a group of law enforcement executives who
conduct research (Police Executive Research Forum, 2016).
7. Proactivity – strategies in policing that are successful in preventing crime (National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2018).
8. Transparency – the ability to monitor the behavior of another (Meijer, 2013).
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW
Overview
In Chapter 2, an in-depth literature review was conducted that sought to identify if police
officers were pulling away and curtailing their proactive initiatives after being equipped with a
body-worn camera and if the activity level correlates to the crime rates. The chapter begins with
four theoretical frameworks. Two of the theories, deterrence theory and self-awareness theory,
are the foundation and rationale for the deployment of the BWCs. The career-stage theory aims
to explore the decrease in officer activity over time and if the camera accelerates this decrease
while the social learning theory rationalizes why officers have become apprehensive in carrying
out their police duties. The related literature explored the triggers that prompted BWCs, the
premise surrounding BWCs, and the unintended consequences that have begun to surface. For
example, there has been a rise in the number of line-of-duty deaths and assaults on police
officers. Additionally, the literature explored officer burnout and the media’s role with the
chapter concluding with a discussion about the rising crime rates and curtailed officer activity.
Theoretical Framework
Theories are most often used to explain human behavior and for understanding the human
thought process. Theories are especially constructive in the criminal justice field and have long
provided explanations for crime and punishment. This research explored four theoretical
frameworks to support the explanation of BWCs and the potential the cameras have for inducing
the curtailment of officer proactive patrol activities. The four theories underpinning this research
are deterrence theory, career-stage theory, social learning theory, and self-awareness theory.
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Deterrence Theory
Deterrence theory was first conceived by Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham in the
18th century (Pickett et al., 2018). Deterrence theory is the foundation behind crime and
punishment. Deterrence theory explicates why humans seek pleasure but will avoid procurement
of those pleasures should they potentially cause punishment. Deterrence theory rationalizes that
if a particular action has a high propensity of producing an undesirable consequence, and that
consequence has the likelihood of being promptly imposed, then rational individuals are likely to
be disinclined to avoid the repercussions (Lee, 2017).
Likewise, fear is an emotion people experience when visualizing danger which causes
them to be reluctant or hesitant when considering an action (Pickett et al., 2018). The authors say
fear causes anxiety because the individual recognizes there are consequences that could be
incurred. Furthermore, they say the feeling of fear has been hypothesized as a critical component
of deterrence. The element of fear is often the rationalization behind why some people are
reluctant to engage in criminal activity or activity that could bring unintended consequences as
they fear the possibility of repercussions from those of authority. Romans 13:1-5 states:
Everyone must submit to governing authorities. For all authority comes from God, and
those in positions of authority have been placed there by God. So anyone who rebels
against authority is rebelling against what God has instituted, and they will be punished.
For the authorities do not strike fear in people who are doing right, but in those who are
doing wrong. Would like to live without fear of the authories? Do what is right, and they
will honor you. The authorities are God’s servants, sent for your good. But if you are
doing wrong, of course you should be afraid, for they have the power to punish you.
They are God’s servants, sent for the very purpose of punishing those who do what is
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wrong. So you must submit to them, not only to avoid punishment, but also to keep a
clear conscience. (New Living Translation)
Although deterrence theory is commonly associated to explain criminal activity and how most
rational people will weigh the reward of a deviant act versus the risk, this theory is asserted to
explain why some officers will curtail proactive initiatives which is to shirk adverse
consequences (Demir et al., 2020). Moreover, the hypothetical instrument behind BWCs is
grounded on an expansive and fundamentally substantiated theory of deterrence aimed at
controlling deviant behavior on both sides of the camera (Ariel et al., 2017).
Career-Stage Theory
An officer’s lack of self-initiative or the curtailment of proactive activities may occur for
other reasons. The second theory to be examined is the career-stage theory which was first
proposed by Donald Super in 1957 (Johnson & Lafrance, 2016). Career-stage theory proposes
there are differing levels of productivity throughout a person’s career (Bonkiewicz, 2017).
According to Johnson and Lafrance, career-stage theory evaluates the notion that employees
advance through different stages, generally distinguished by length of tenure. They claim the
career stages are posited as well-defined periods of psychological and behavioral examination,
acclimatization, and steadiness in one’s employment. Career-stage theory, according to Johnson
and Lafrance, shows that most employees will undergo four stages throughout the development
of their careers with each stage represented by a 5-year span.
The first stage is the exploration stage. This stage transpires when the newly recruited
employee is anxious in discovering the new processes associated with their career interests and
their abilities that are the basis in forming their career (Johnson & Lafrance, 2016). They state
the second stage, the establishment stage, is the era of time in which the employee concentrates
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on fortifying their career by polishing their basic skills. They espouse the maintenance stage,
stage three, involves the employee’s drive to hold onto career achievements such as their
reputation, rank, and other achievements, however, some may even seek to advance further while
in this stage. Johnson and Lafrance, say the final stage, otherwise known as the disengagement
stage, comes towards the conclusion of an employee’s time within their employer and this final
stage is where the employee’s work energy and work interests diminish and fade, thus work
productivity severely decreases.
The career-stage theory provides an explanation of the naturally occurring decrease in
proactivity that is often found among many professions. This study seeks to explore if BWCs
contribute to a more rapid decrease in officer proactivity as their career progresses. Johnson and
Lafrance (2016), believe career-stage theory illustrates an employee’s evolution throughout their
career with behavior and attitude specific to each stage. They declare most of the career-stage
research conducted thus far has analyzed the “relationship between career stage and employee
work attitudes, such as job satisfaction, organizational commitment, career commitment, work
ethic, and turnover intent” (p. 1581). However, these authors assert there is little proof that
illustrates a correlation between actual behavior and career-stage, specifically in the criminal
justice profession. This study aims to contribute to this gap in knowledge as this study sought to
determine if BWCs contributed to an accelerated decrease in officer proactivity in conjunction
with the naturally occurring decrease found in the career-stage theory.
Social Learning Theory
Albert Bandura’s social learning theory posits that individuals learn by observing and
imitating the behavior of others (Mayes, 2015). They maintain these observers then determine if
a particular behavior results in positive or negative consequences. Positive consequences will
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often encourage or promote the behavior while negative consequences customarily desist or
discourage an individual from engaging in the observed behavior. Former Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) Director, James Comey, has indicated that political protests and mass media
coverage of several high-profile police shootings, involving minority civilians in recent years,
are having a negative impact on police officers, thus deterring them from proactively engaging
with people within their community (MacDonald, 2019). The widespread anti-police sentiment
reported in the media and demonstrated by various groups such as Black Lives Matter,
Campaign Zero, and other social justice groups place officers in fear of generating discipline that
could negatively impact their employment or family life (Maguire et al., 2017).
Self-awareness theory
Self-awareness is a psychosocial occurrence that regulates an individual’s behavior (Ariel
et al., 2018). First evaluated by George Mead in the 1930’s, a person becomes conscientious of
their behavior when they are aware their behavior may not reflect social norms (Wicklund &
Duval, 1971). Ariel et al. argues self-awareness allows an individual to produce a preferred
image of oneself. The premise behind self-awareness is that individuals who are aware they are
being watched will often modify their behavior and conform to social norms (Ariel et al., 2015;
Demir et al., 2020). Job 34:21 reads, “For God watches how people live; he sees everything they
do” (New Living Translation). This may explain why some people cooperate with figures of
authority and even more so when the authority figure is wearing a camera. Believers in God
describe God as a type of social facilitator who observes the thoughts and actions of those on
earth, thus making believers feel they are being watched (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012).
Environmental cues and objects such as mirrors, video and audio recording instruments,
an audience, or just being surrounded by other people can arouse self-awareness and encourage
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socially acceptable behavior (Braga et al., 2020). Self-awareness theory operates in tandem with
the deterrence theory in that being discovered should provoke fear of undesirable consequences,
thus curtailing undesirable behavior. The premise behind BWCs is to improve the behavior of
police and citizens alike because one’s self-awareness would be heightened knowing a camera is
recording, thus deterring poor behavior from either party (Groff et al., 2020; Hughes et al.,
2020). Therefore, for police officers, BWCs deliver that constraint on an amplified level in that
not only is someone witnessing the performance and conduct, but that the scrutinizing entity will
penalize those for wrongdoings (Berg et al., 2016; Hedberg et al., 2017).
A study conducted by Groff et al. (2020), confirmed the presumption that the cameras
worn by officers elevate one’s self-awareness, driving officers to pull back from proactive
activities. As a result, BWCs may be triggering a heightened inspection of oneself that is so great
that it creates an “over-deterrence” effect in police officers (Ariel et al., 2018). They claim this
surplus of deterrence can be a contributing factor for why some officers are more hesitant to use
justified force, which in turn results in more assaults on police officers. Furthermore, they say
that instead of the officers using the necessary force to restrain combative individuals some
officers are discouraged to use any force fearing potential discipline, as it may be construed as
inappropriate. Ariel et al. profess this phenomenon illustrates a grim side of self-awareness that
was unpredicted and severely under-researched. Why would police officers proactively seek out
interactions with potentially recalcitrant individuals knowing they could be the next viral video
or worse, be indicted? Officers encounter disorderly and disobedient citizens frequently
unbeknownst to them how the encounter will play out. 2 Timothy 2:15 states, “Work hard so you
can present yourself to God and receive his approval. Be a good worker, one who does not need
to be ashamed and who correctly explains the word of truth" (New Living Translation). Officers
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should not be in fear of performing their duties. Do their actions correspond with the morals and
beliefs God has instilled in them regardless of wearing a camera? If more people contemplated
how God perceives them, BWCs would not be at the forefront of police reform. God created one
another to care for one another, not to inflict pain, harm, or distrust.
Numerous studies evaluating self-awareness theory and BWCs frequently report that
when BWCs are worn by the police officer the number of use of force incidents and citizens
complaints against that officer are reduced (Ariel et al., 2017; Henstock & Ariel, 2017). This
decrease has been touted extensively following the highly publicized Rialto, California
experiment that was conducted in 2013 (Crow et al., 2017; Schneider, 2018). The Rialto
experiment, as it is often referred to, published almost a 90% decrease in complaints and more
than a 50% reduction in officers using force (Gaub et al., 2016). However, officer activity levels
were not measured throughout this experiment and there are very few scholars who have
attempted to identify officer activity levels since the deployment of BWCs (White et al., 2018).
An officer’s activity level may decrease after implementing BWCs because officers are aware
their actions are subject to scrutiny.
The likelihood for intensified scrutiny by police administrators and the public may cause
officers to withdraw from self-initiated activities (Groff et al., 2020). In other words, they will
continue to answer calls for service but will drastically reduce the number of times they seek out
interactions with citizens (Shjarback et al., 2017; Wallace et al., 2018). Shjarback et al. says this
newly adopted tactic suggests the officer’s need to abate the risk of punishment, public
examination, and their own injury or death, should the officer lack self-restraint in language or
physical force situations. Moreover, they maintain officers are embarking on avoidance
behaviors as a means of self-preservation. This may be a contributing factor for the reduction in
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citizen complaints and use of force because the officer is making less contacts with the public.
This research seeks to identify if officer proactivity levels decrease after BWCs are implemented
and if there is a correlation to the crime rates.
This study seeks to support the deterrence theory by demonstrating that officers are
curtailing proactive initiatives due to the deployment of BWCs that provide an audio and visual
narrative of interactions with the public. Recent, high-profile cases such as Sandra Bland,
Breonna Taylor, and George Floyd have illustrated how quickly an officer is propelled into the
limelight and their world turned upside down from video footage. This study will attempt to
associate Bandura’s learning theory as a possible explanation for the decrease in officer activity
should a decrease be discovered. Major events that have brought shame and embarassment to the
police profession may be causing officers to think twice before initiating a citizen encounter.
The career-stage theory will be used to evaluate the officer’s proactivity level over time and
whether this proactivity level significantly decreases once the BWCs are implemented.
Futhermore, should the data show a significant tapering in officer activity both the career-stage
and self-awareness theories may be validated as officers become more aware they are being
watched. However, a qualitative study would need to be performed to extract the precise
reasoning behind the decrease.
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Related Literature
Triggers that Prompted BWCs
Since 2014, there has been an upsurge in public disapproval over what many believe is
excessive force imposed by police officers and the level to which those officers are held
accountable for the outcome of their incident (White et al., 2018). The deaths of Michael Brown
in Ferguson, Missouri; Eric Garner in Stanton Island, New York; Tamir Rice in Cleveland, Ohio;
Walter Scott in North Charleston, South Carolina; Freddie Gray in Baltimore, Maryland; Samuel
Dubose in Cincinnati, Ohio; and Justine Damond and George Floyd (2017 and 2020
respectively) in Minneapolis, Minnesota, have triggered public anger and a demand for change in
the police culture (White et al., 2018). Since the events involving the individuals named above
along with many others, numerous cities have experienced civil mayhem and riots, marches,
protests, extensive media attention, and intensified public examination of the police (Campbell et
al., 2017; Engel et al., 2020). Additionally, White et al. believes communities nationwide have
commanded police reform to lessen the chance of civil rights violations and citizen-police
confrontations.
The highly publicized shooting incident involving Michael Brown and Ferguson,
Missouri Police Officer Darren Wilson was a pivotal turning point for police professionals across
the country and just one of many cases that spawned the outcry for police reform (Bromberg et
al., 2018; Chapman, 2019). These incidents prompted various police leadership groups to reexamine the strategies used by officers such as use of force policies and procedures, deescalation tactics, and racial profiling; elements that frequently lead to officer-involved shootings
(Robinson, 2020).
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The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) is an independent research organization
that addresses issues that are imperative to the police profession including community issues,
police use of force, and technology to enhance police services. The PERF took the initiative in
establishing a robust guide concerning officers and de-escalation techniques which are shown to
reduce the need for officers to utilize use of force tactics (Robinson, 2020). More specifically,
Robinson claims the de-escalation techniques focus on incidents where individuals suffer from
mental issues or who may be under the influence of drugs, as well as those armed with a knife or
firearm.
Texas, just one of many states, embraced the PERF’s recommendation that all peace
officers throughout the state of Texas are now required to undergo 40 hours of Crisis
Intervention Training (CIT) with annual updates (Robinson, 2020). Robinson says this education
strives to provide officers with more resources so that officers have a reduced propensity to
respond with physical or deadly force. Additionally, Robinson claims, the revisions are showing
success in that additional training has been implemented in almost 40% of police agencies
nationwide (2015-2017) with a 20% decrease in officer-involved shootings during the same time
frame.
Issues surrounding police misconduct prompted former President Barack Obama to create
a task force to overhaul police practices and address police reform (White et al., 2018). In
December 2014, former President Barack Obama assembled the President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing to include a partnership of police chiefs, mayors, community leaders, and other
criminal justice professionals from around the country. The President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing set variois goals, one being to explore and develop systems in which the police
and the public could work collaboratively to fight crime and build relationships instead of
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working in opposition of one another. The task force was directed to discover and categorize best
practices in policing and then propose suggestions that could deter and reduce crime while
promoting and re-establishing the public's trust (Wallace et al., 2018).
One suggestion that was heavily supported by the task force, the public, and other
stakeholders as a means to increase trust between the public and the police was the deployment
of BWCs (President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015). The overwhelming consensus
drove former President, Barack Obama to initiate a $75 million match program from the $263
million projected investment package on police reform to assist police agencies with obtaining
BWCs (Ariel et al., 2016; Bromberg et al., 2018). The task force understood the BWCs would
not be the magic bullet and would need to be carefully implemented, but that the cameras could
be a step in the direction of greater transparency and officer accountability (Office of the Press
Secretary, 2014). Since then, the police profession has swiftly implemented change with many
agencies stepping up and re-evaluating their policies and procedures (Robinson, 2020).
Additionally, he declares numerous agencies have adopted the recommended training in
conjunction with the technology of the BWCs.
In 2016, nearly 50% of the eighteen thousand police agencies across the U.S. had
implemented BWCs (Hyland, 2018). This is just two years after the shooting death of Michael
Brown, the incident that prompted the cameras. As of 2020, 50% of the agencies who do not
have BWCs have devised a strategy to implement them (Engel et al., 2020). This rapid
implementation shows just how quickly police departments were to jump on the new technology.
In addition to improving transparency and officer accountability, police agencies have named
many motivations for the adoption of BWCs. More than three-quarters of the agencies who
deploy the cameras have indicated they have done so for officer safety reasons, for enhancing
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evidence, to reduce citizen complaints, and to cut down on the agency’s liability according to
Hyland. He says those who have yet to adopt the new technology have cited video storage costs
as the primary reason for the delay.
After the string of what has been viewed as unjustified officer-involved shootings across
the country, the public is no longer remaining silent and has demonstrated their plea for
immediate police reform (Hedberg et al., 2017). Citizen’s are demanding that police agencies
hold their officers accountable to improve their behavior, transparency, and legitimacy (Ray et
al., 2017; Wright & Brown, 2020). Equipping police officers with BWCs is touted by federal and
state lawmakers as just one approach at affording citizens more transparency when engaging
with police according to Ray et al. Wright and Brown assert the BWCs audibly and visually
record an officer’s actions that can be verified by others. The President’s Task Force on 21st
Century Policing (2015) believed that BWCs could potentially aid in building relationships with
the public and enhance police practices as they are a tool to reduce the use of force and record
interactions (Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2015). However, the BWCs are not the panacea many
thought the cameras would be and may even be responsible for negative ramifications (Lum et
al., 2017; Rosenfeld & Wallman, 2019). Several studies have indicated that the BWCs have
compelled officers to withdraw from proactive initiatives which may be a cause for an uptick in
crime (Marier & Fridell, 2020; Wallace et al., 2018).
Premise Surrounding the BWCs
The premise surrounding the commissioning of the BWCs was that of officer and agency
transparency, officer accountability, improved behavior by both officers and citizens, and
officers using less force after a political spotlight illuminated how several citizens lost their lives
at the hands of the police (Ariel et al., 2015; Chapman, 2019; Crow & Smykla, 2019). The
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camera is considered a de-escalation tool, thus improving interactions between officers and
citizens (NSW Police Department, 2018). Advocates of BWCs espouse the cameras would
generate detailed records of police encounters and crime scenes (Christodoulou et al., 2019).
They further advocate the BWCs would reduce complications regarding the court process such
that investigations would be completed more timely and accurately, appropriate charges would
be filed, and the trial process would go more smoothly. In addition to this, supporters of the
BWCs assumed the cameras would identify problems in policing or police procedures and that
the BWCs would reduce officer paperwork, therefore, allowing officers more time to tend to
patrol duties (Ayres, 2014). Scholars have found the cameras to have positive effects such as
reduced complaints and less use of force by officers, however, there have been unintended
consequences that have surfaced requiring more research to be conducted (Ariel, 2016; Malm,
2019; Mateescu et al., 2016).
Countless dimensions of research throughout multiple fields of science assert that people
will modify their behavior when they are cognizant of being watched, thus deterring undesirable
behavior (Ariel et al., 2015). Multiple studies have been conducted on the effects of BWCs and
officer-citizen behavior. It has been posited that BWCs seemingly produce a “civilizing effect by
improving the behavior of both police officers and citizens” as both parties recognize their
interactions on camera are accessible by others and, thus, can be reviewed if necessary (Headley
et al., 2017, p. 103). Nevertheless, most of the research that has been conducted is generally
concentrated on officer behavior since this is the behavior that has been deemed in need of
change and in need of transparency (Braga et al., 2018; Gonzales & Cochran, 2017).
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Unintended Consequences of the BWC
According to Hedberg et al. (2017), the initial investment appropriated by the President’s
Task Force positioned nearly 6,000 BWCs into the hands of numerous police departments across
the United States. Bowling and Iyer (2019) suggest there are at least 1.5 million body-worn
cameras utilized worldwide with the market responding eagerly to produce thousands more.
Arming officers with BWCs has been noted as just one of many reasonable responses to the
present police legitimacy calamity currently being demonstrated across many U.S. cities (Demir,
2020). The rapid undertaking of equipping a police officer’s uniform with a mobile camera
sounds promising (a continuous stream of audio and visual recordings between officers and
citizens) and has had some positive outcomes (Mateescu et al., 2016; Malm, 2019). For example,
some agencies have seen de-escalation practices increase and officer aggressiveness decrease
(Braga et al., 2018). This has resulted in a reduced number of officers using force and citizen
complaints, although these results are not generalizable nationwide (Braga et al., 2018).
The Rialto experiment, one of the first experiments launched examining BWCs, showed
promising results when the study revealed that officers who did not operate with a camera had
twice as many incidents involving the use of force than those who displayed the camera (Ariel,
2016). Some scholars believe there are numerous explanations why the Rialto experiment was so
successful, for example, it could have been the small number of officers within the agency or the
level of support from the community in which the department is situated (Hughes et al., 2020;
Sacca, 2017). Moreover, the Rialto experiment showed much success because officers and
citizens alike may have altered their behavior prior to the pretest knowing the cameras were
imposed to facilitate more civil interactions (Ariel et al., 2021). They say similar pretest results
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have been difficult to mimic hence why the results from the Rialto experiment are difficult to
replicate years later.
Sacca (2017) relates BWCs to the police dash cams that were rolled out in the early
2000s and the closed-circuit television (CCTV) that made its start in the United Kingdom. Sacca
espouses the cameras may generate an initial improvement in behavior from both sides, but over
time the deterrence of the camera fades. Sacca also believes that people's emotions will take over
and outweigh rational thoughts during high-stress situations. The early studies conducted
involving the Rialto police department and three agencies in Arizona (Phoenix, Tempe, and
Mesa) showed a decrease in officer use of force as stated by Sacca. In contrast, they say the
study conducted by Pang and Pavlou displayed a 3.6% increase in officer-involved shootings.
Sacca credits the small size of the agencies in Arizona and Rialto for the decrease in officer use
of force. Concerning the Rialto experiment, Ariel et al. (2021) believe:
early studies in which the treatment (i.e. BWCs) was a ‘surprise’ detected significant
pretest-posttest effects on the outcome measure, the pretest in later studies was
contaminated because the change in behaviour already existed prior to the baseline
measure. They have already seen the gorilla. (p. 60)
In other words, officers knew the intended outcome was to show more favorable police-citizen
interactions so officers assisted in acquiring the desired results by knowingly modifying their
behavior. Ariel et al. states the cameras were being employed so that officers would stop
exceeding their bounds and have more mutually satisfying interactions with citizens.
Furthermore, research conducted in varying police agencies elsewhere, since the Rialto
experiment, indicate outcomes are the inverse or mixed (Lum et al., 2019). Additionally,
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potential negative implications have been discovered since employing the rapidly evolving
technological tool primarily in part to the lack of rigorous research (Wright & Headley, 2021).
What advocates of the BWCs did not foresee was that wearing a camera, while fulfilling
a police officer's mission and responsibilities, has resulted in many adverse effects and
unintended consequences (Lum et al., 2017; Wright & Headley, 2021). These adverse effects
range from an increase in officers using force, an increase in assaults and ambushes on police
officers, officer burnout, curtailed self-initiated activity, and in some cities, there has been an
uptick in the violent crime rate and a decrease in arrests (Ariel et al., 2016; Campbell et al.,
2017;). Although there is no hard evidence that suggests BWCs are solely responsible for these
adverse events, many scholars believe they contribute to it (Adams & Mastracci, 2019; Ariel et
al., 2016)
Officers Killed and Assaulted
Every year police officers are killed in the line of duty and thousands more are assaulted
while performing their duties. In 2013, the FBI reported 27 police officers were killed in the line
of duty, with five being ambushed and six more killed while attempting to arrest the individual
(U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2014). During that same year, the
U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation stated that nearly 11,500 police
agencies reported more than 49,800 assaults on police officers. In 2014, the number of police
officers killed in the line of duty reached 51, a 47% increase from 2013 (U.S. Department of
Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2020). However, 2016 saw the highest number of lineof-duty deaths top out at 66 across the United States with ambushes contributing heavily to this
count (Engel et al., 2020).
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Police officer safety is a growing concern for police administrators and the officers
themselves (Engel et al., 2020; Sierra-Arevalo & Nix, 2020). Some scholars believe segments of
the public have declared a “war on cops” subsequent to the killing of Michael Brown (Maguire et
al., 2017). For example, Engel et al. recounts that police officers from Dallas, Texas, were
ambushed in July 2016, leaving five dead and nine more officers injured. They report that just
ten days later, three Baton Rouge, Louisiana, officers were killed in an ambush and three more
wounded. In 2019, 2,000 fewer agencies than in 2013, reported assaults that occurred on police
officers to the FBI due to voluntary reporting practices according to Sierra-Arevalo and Nix.
Even though there was a significant drop in agency reports, the number of officers assaulted
jumped to more than 56,000 in 2019 (U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 2020).
Although there are no studies to associate line of duty deaths with BWCs, the increase in
line of duty deaths and assaults on police officers is troubling. Moreover, there are numerous
studies that suggest BWCs may be a contributing factor in the increase in assaults on police
officers due to hesitation, fear of discipline, or because officers feel they lack discretion (Ariel et
al., 2016; Wallace et al., 2018). Early studies have suggested that police officers are coming
under fire and are being assaulted while attempting an arrest, more so when officers are wearing
cameras (Maguire et al., 2017; Moule, 2020). It is believed the unanticipated repercussions stem
from officers wearing BWCs and that these types of incidents have increased drastically in recent
years (Ariel, et al., 2018; Braga et al., 2018). These repercussions are not generalizable because
the increase has only been found in a limited number of studies partly due to the lack of research.
In addition, due to the variations in research methodologies scholars have found the severity of
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the assaults to differ as some assaults are physical while others are described as officers being
threatened by a weapon (Sierra-Arevalo & Nix, 2020).
The theory behind BWCs is that both the police and citizens will demonstrate more civil
behavior, hence the self-awareness theory, thus lessening conflict and physical encounters
(Demir et al., 2020). However, studies show that other filming devices, such as cell phones and
CCTV, have a limited effect on a person's behavior (Welsh & Farrington, 2009). Adams and
Mastracci (2019) pulled ten recent scholarly studies and out of the ten studies that examined an
officer's use of force, four showed a decrease, one showed an increase, four showed no effect,
and one found mixed results. They claim two of the studies that showed no effect on officer use
of force did show an increase in assaults on officers. Moreover, they declare this diverse range of
results suggests these conclusions are not generalizable and that there are many other factors that
are contributing to these outcomes, thus there is still a lot to learn about the impact BWCs have
overall in the police profession.
The BWCs would conceivably capture inappropriate behavior as it is affixed most often
to the front of an officer’s uniform. For most individuals, this would deter inappropriate behavior
from both officers and citizens alike. However, Ariel et al. (2016) found a 14% increase in
assaults on police officers who wore the camera compared to those who did not display one.
They also state the number of assaults on police officers could be higher as these are only the
assaults that were reported. This area of concern is understudied, therefore there is no consensus
or one element that can pinpoint why officers, who wear BWCs, are vulnerable to being
assaulted (Gorner & Dardick, 2016).
There is speculation that many officers fear scrutiny from the media and their police
agency; therefore, they hesitate or second guess their actions, which puts them in harms way
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(Gorner & Dardick, 2016). Officers are hesitating to take the necessary action to gain control of a
person in part on how their actions might be perceived on camera (Bierie, 2017). Bierie believes
this hesitation is costly on many levels. First, Bierie says, officers who are attacked may need to
be treated for injuries and then they must follow through with the use of force hearings.
Secondly, Bierie furthers this by saying there is a disruption in services should the officer be
placed on administrative leave. These instances are monetary costs incurred by the taxpayers;
however, Bierie believes the greatest loss occurs when there is a breakdown in trust whereby
police and community relations become strained. Bierie explains that when an officer uses force
to counteract an attack, the media and public are quick to judge and scrutinize, leaving officers
second-guessing themselves.
BWCs, Officer Burnout, and the Media
Policing is known to be a dangerous profession as officers experience many unknowns as
they are dispatched from call to call. Psalm 106:3 reads, “There is joy for those who deal justly
with others and always do what is right” (New Living Translation). It has been difficult for
police agencies to maintain a consistent number of officers to do the job as applicants looking to
join police agencies has been dwindling in recent years (Clinkinbeard et al., 2021). Agencies
have many challenges that hinder them from receiving qualified applicants such as a decrease in
public trust stemming from viral videos, officers being attacked and killed on duty, and new
social norms such as tattoos and marijuana use according to Clinkinbeard et al. Reform is not
just for those on the other side of the badge, but also for those who wear the badge, who want to
uphold the laws and continue to protect and serve.
The police profession is one that has come under attack in recent years with higher than
normal scrutiny, elevated challenges, and increased demands which is concerning to many police
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administrators and officers alike (McCarty et al., 2019; Sierra-Arevalo & Nix, 2020). Those in
the police profession succumb to burnout more rapidly than any other profession (Schaible &
Six, 2016). Since the surge of BWCs, countless studies have evaluated the camera and its effect
on an officer’s use of force, the number of external complaints, the likelihood of officers being
assaulted, an officer’s arrest activity, judicial outcomes, and other topics. However, there are
very few studies that examine the connection between officer burnout and BWCs which is
alarming since burnout may be contributing to the list of research topics above (Adams &
Mastracci, 2019). McCarty et al. says the emotional exhaustion and depersonalization aspect
associated with wearing a camera can cause officers to pull back from public interactions, thus
inhibiting self-initiated activities.
Adams and Mastracci (2019) found that earlier reports of surveillance in the workplace
contributes to burnout and the perception of low organizational support. The BWCs are more
encroaching than a fixed surveillance camera as it is affixed to the front of the officer's uniform
and goes wherever the officer goes; there is no way to dodge the camera during the shift. Even
though many of the cameras are operated manually by the officer, most BWCs record in a loop
which enables the camera to record a prescribed set amount of time prior to the officer’s manual
activation as conveyed in the Milwaukee study (Lawrence & Peterson, 2020). The feeling of
being trapped by the camera is real and officer discretion is now made to feel limited (Adams &
Mastracci, 2019). Officers sense that every decision needs to be “by the book”, officers are to
display emotions that are not sincere, or the officer refrains from showing true emotions which
also contributes to an increase in stress and burnout (Schaible & Six, 2016). Compound this with
officers putting on a front to disguise sadness and disgust when responding and handling
traumatic scenes. Adams and Mastracci explain that emotional concealment mars working
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memory and intensifies cardiovascular demands, leading to health consequences. Furthermore,
they allege gallows humor, often found in first responders' culture as a coping mechanism, can
be misinterpreted on the BWCs and seen as ill-mannered, putting officers on the defensive or
further into the hotseat.
Adams and Mastracci (2019) espouse that street officers display the highest burnout rate
compared to any other profession. They believe BWCs may intensify burnout as police officers
attempt to build accountability with those in the community, conform with administrative
oversight, and constant observation. BWCs will not be abandoned anytime soon and their use
will only increase. They suggest one way to combat burnout and the adverse effects that
accompany it is for police administrators to develop policies and practices regarding BWCs that
demonstrate care and support. Lum et al. (2019) argue the more organizational justice an officer
feels within his department, the more secure they feel about wearing a camera thus, less afraid to
make citizen interactions. Additionally, they say the more committed an officer becomes within
their department the less skeptical and resistant they are to the BWCs and the repercussions they
bring with them.
Media coverage of officer-involved shootings or any other objectionable police behavior
caught on camera has shrouded news headlines in recent years. Media coverage is another type
of constant observation officers contend with. The news media plays a pivotal role in how the
police are perceived and how police choose to conduct their duties (Culhane & Schweitzer,
2017). They have found that media coverage depicting an officer using force will affect a
citizen's perception of police overall. The Rialto study was the first controlled experiment
assessing BWCs and police use of force (Ariel et al., 2015). This study and its findings have
been cited extensively by the media stating that BWCs reduce officer use of force and citizen
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complaints, thus steering the public to believe that BWCs are a panacea and should control for
undesirable behavior among police officers (Schneider, 2018).
The OIS concerning Michael Brown and officer Darren Wilson sparked national concern
and furthered the debate over the use and deployment of BWCs. This incident, in 2014, spurred
what many call the “Ferguson Effect”. The “Ferguson Effect” is a rise in the crime rates,
consequently in part to the alleged lack of proactive police efforts in the community
(MacDonald, 2019). Former FBI Director, James Comey, has stated that officers feel they are
being heavily scrutinized by the public and the media, thus inhibiting their willingness to engage
in proactive police work according to MacDonald. Some say negative social media attention,
civil unrest, and protests are causing police officers to think twice before interacting with the
public (Pyrooz et al., 2016).
Media headlines frequently emphasize that officers face heightened levels of hostility and
violence towards them which has been spawned by the increase in anti-police sentiment (Intravia
et al., 2018). This scrutiny deters officers from performing proactive activities (Chatterjee &
Ryan, 2020). Chatterjee and Ryan found the profession of policing to be significantly
stigmatized when compared to other occupations and say a stigma this intense has consequences.
They believe the police profession is at the forefront of national media topics with profound
implications for those who serve as police officers and for those who rely of their services.
Officers who wear BWCs are no longer impervious to examination (Emmeline, 2016).
Officers are now subject to having their words and actions scrutinized and dissected should their
video footage be reviewed, a complaint generated, a case goes to court, or an incident goes awry
(Culhane & Schweitzer, 2017; Koen, Willis, & Mastrofski, 2018). Police officers can have
questionable, precarious, and sometimes unflattering encounters throughout their shift. Often
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times these encounters are caught on a citizen’s cell phone. The unflattering encounters then get
played out on numerous media sites across the country and scrutinized frame by frame. This
public scrutiny inhibits an officer’s willingness to interact with citizens out of fear of the
unknown, therefore, causing officers to withdraw from proactive policing (Shjarback et al.,
2017). It has been more than five years since BWCs were rapidly introduced and some agencies
are finding a mix of undesirable and unintended consequences surfacing (Hughes et al., 2020).
A verse from the book of John encapsulates what it is like to be a police officer who is
dedicated to serving his community all the while willing to uphold the law and do what is right
stated in John 10:8-15:
All who came before me were thieves and robbers. But the true sheep did not listen to
them. Yes, I am the gate. Those who come in through me will saved. They will come and
go freely and will find good pastures. The thief’s purpose is to steal and kill and destroy.
My purpose is to give them a rich and satisfying life. I am the good shepherd. The good
shepherd sacrifices his life for the sheep. A hired hand will run when he sees a wolf
coming. He will abandon the sheep because they don’t belong to him and he isn’t their
shepherd. And so the wolf attacks them and scatters the flock. The hired hand runs away
because he’s working only for the money and doesn’t really care about the sheep. I am
the good shepherd; I know my own sheep, and they know me, just as my Father knows
me and I know the Father. o I sacrifice my life for the sheep” (New Living Translation).
The Rise in Crime
Between 1990 and 1993 the nation endured a spike in crime of epic proportions
(Barranco et al., 2018). They claim more than 100,000 homicides took place in this three-year
period which is equivalent to more than 270 fully loaded 747 airplanes. The crime rates,
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however, began to fall in the mid-1990s largely in part to the stringent increase in the
incarceration rate (Lofstrom & Raphael, 2016). Increasing the number of incarcerations meant
there were fewer criminals on the streets to commit additional crimes. Other theories that allude
to the drastic reduction in crime include the legalization of abortion, decrease in alcohol and
crack cocaine use, better wages, the reduction of lead in gasoline, and an aging population (Berg
et al., 2016).
In 2015, the nation’s violent crime rate had dropped nearly 76% as compared to that of
1993 (Morgan & Oudekerk, 2019). However, they realized beginning in 2015, agencies were
beginning to see a statistically significant increase in crime and by 2018 there had been nearly
600,000 more people victimized in the U.S. than years prior to 2015. They say this equates to a
28% increase in violent victimizations in just three years. The National Crime Victims Survey
(NCVS) records data gathered from surveys distributed to households each year, taking into
consideration victims of crime age 12 and older according to Morgan and Oudekerk. They report
that during the same three years victims reported 800,000 more violent incidents suggesting one
victim may experience more than one criminal act. In addition to actual crimes committed, the
NCVS takes the threat of violence into consideration as well. The surveys indicate that from
2015-2018 threats of violence across the U.S. also increased with 6.1 reported threats of
victimization per 1000 individuals in 2015 to an excess of 9.2 threats of victimizations per 1000
just three years later reports Morgan and Oudekerk.
Stakeholders, politicians, and other observers are now coming forward after noticing the
spike in crime and speculating the trend may coincide with an increase in de-policing (Rosenfeld
& Wallman, 2019). They describe de-policing as officers pulling back from their duties,
unwilling to proactively engage individuals out of fear of legal or disciplinary repercussions. De-
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policing has also been referred to as the “Ferguson Effect,” a phrase first proposed by Ferguson,
Missouri’s police chief, Sam Dotson when discussing the rise in assaults and robberies and the
decrease in arrests made by his officers (Gonzales & Cochran, 2017). Rosenfeld and Wallman
declare the homicide rates in the U.S. escalated sharply in 2015, after declining uninterruptedly
for more than twenty years. These authors also state the “Ferguson Effect” has been blamed for
this increase across the country. They espouse the media latched on to the phrase “Ferguson
Effect” as a way of suggesting that police officers have separated themselves from proactive law
enforcement out of fear of elevated legal liability or exposure to scrutiny on social or
conventional media outlets. Moreover, they stated the media furthered this idea by suggesting
that officers disengaging from proactive enforcement activities is a direct cause to the increase in
crime.
The “Ferguson Effect” has been described as police officers disengaging from proactive
police practices due to high-profile, negative use of force incidents that have emanated across
various media outlets (Gonzales & Cochran, 2017). These scholars have seen these negative
incidents that are widely publicized and bring about criticism to the police profession. Maguire et
al. (2017), contend that scholars are discovering that officers work in fear of discipline, in fear of
losing their jobs or pensions, and in fear of being prosecuted, or sued. Furthermore, they believe
that officers are hesitating to react or actively shying away from taking police action which is
putting the officers at significant risk of harm. During the first seven months of 2020, 32 law
enforcement officers nationwide were shot to death, a 28% jump over the same time frame as
last year (Hutchinson, 2020). The killing of police officers coupled with media and department
scrutiny may be a contributing factor to the lack of proactive police work and the possible
increase in crime.
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Conversely, Pyrooz et al. (2016) do not believe an officer's unwillingness to engage
proactively contributes to the high crime rate. In fact, Pyrooz et al. believe citizens are
disgruntled at the perceived unfairness, and this unfairness leads to disconformity, crime, and
disorder. Another theory that Pyrooz et al. has contemplated is that crime rates have been at an
all-time low for decades, so a rise in crime is inevitable. Moreover, Richard Rosenfeld, a
professor in St. Louis, Missouri, noticed the increase in homicides, but he too, did not support
the “Ferguson Effect” as a contributing factor (Gonzales & Cochran, 2017). Rosenfeld found that
homicide rates increased significantly, more than 16%, nationwide in 2015 according to
Gonzales and Cochran. Additionally, they claim Rosenfeld discovered the homicide rates for
many large cities rose more in one year than they had in the last 50 years. They say that
Rosenfeld did not want to contribute the rise in crime to merely the “Ferguson Effect”; he did,
however, give three explanations for the uptick (1) urban drug markets were expanding and the
heroin and the opioid market was flourishing (2) the prison population was being trimmed down
and (3) some rendering of the “Ferguson Effect” was contributing to the rise in homicides.
The “Ferguson Effect” has been described as officers withdrawing from their job duties
that include self-initiated contact with the public in combination with an increase in crime.
Gonzales and Cochran (2017) suggest that the “Ferguson Effect” is not about officers
withdrawing from policing, but instead, perhaps it is the African American community's lack of
trust in the police every time a controversial police encounter is radiated across media markets. If
de-policing is racially motivated then communities of color will suffer profound effects (Oliver,
2017). Gonzales and Cochran maintain the BWCs can provide a review process. They believe
this process has proven across many lines that the cameras foster trust, accountability, and
transparency.
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Initially, Rosenfeld’s drug market suggestion appeared reasonable as heroin, and opioid
overdoses were particularly on the climb (Bernstein, 2015; Gonzales & Cochran, 2017). The
reasonableness behind this explanation was the historical precedence set in the 1980s and 1990s
when the crime rate, specifically homicides, rocketed in relation to the cocaine industry and use
(Gonzales & Cochran, 2017). However, the increase in overdoses began in 2011 as reported by
Gonzales and Cochran. They realize the rise in crime was not apparent until 2015, which leaves
people to wonder if the narcotics industry is, in fact, the reason for the increase in homicides and,
if so, why was there such a gap in time? Rosenfeld discredited his own theory about the prison
population contributing to the rise in crime, stating that "released prisoners are arrested at a rate
much greater than the general population" (Gonzales & Cochran, 2017, p. 306). In addition to
this known fact, the prison population has dwindled drastically since 2009, thus another lag in
time that could not explain the rise in crime that was occurring six years after the fact declares
Gonzales and Cochran.
Though reluctant to admit it, Rosenfeld acknowledged some configuration of the
“Ferguson Effect” was behind the increase in violent crime (Gonzales & Cochran, 2017). They
imagine Rosenfeld does not believe officers are less proactive, pulling back from their duties, or
being reluctant, but instead, a loss in the mechanics of policing is contributing to the increased
crime rate. They assume numerous viral videos on the internet, citizen cell phone video, and
heated confrontations with police are blemishing police departments across the nation. These
viral videos raise doubt in the minds of individuals, leaving police officers to second-guess their
career paths and fear for their safety as well as the safety of their families (Ariel et al., 2016;
Groff et al., 2020).
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A recent study conducted by Groff et al. (2020), revealed officers outfitted with BWCs
in the Northeastern portion of the U.S. reported 46% fewer self-initiated pedestrian encounters
and almost a 40% decrease in the number of arrests when compared to their counterparts who do
not employ BWCs while on duty. This study by Groff and others illuminated what many people
fear and that is that officers are very aware of the repercussions BWCs pose and they are
restricting their proactive initiatives. The study by Groff et al. draws attention to the fact that the
cameras may be limiting officer discretion and proactive initiatives and the ramifications this
will have on future relationships and crime rates in the communities.
Many advocates of the BWCs believe the cameras would be the panacea to police
injustices, close the negative officer-citizen gap, and mend relationships between the police and
communities (Lum et al., 2019). Additionally, the cameras are being assumed under the guise
that they will improve officer behavior, accountability, and legitimacy according to the longings
of the public (Ariel, 2016). The BWCs have not brought about the solidarity many had hoped. In
a multi study analysis by Lum et al. variances in officer-citizen behavior and officer-citizen
perceptions of the BWCs were evident across muliple police agencies. This analysis suggests
BWCs are not accomplishing the intended results and may be contributing to adverse effects.
Curtailed Officer Activity
Recent, high-profile, deadly police shootings led to protests, riots, and a call for police
reform to include the addition of BWCs for police accountability and transparency (Crow &
Smykla, 2019; Lum et al., 2019). Government funding, national-level politics, and the rapid
creation of BWCs also facilitated the rapid deployment of cameras across the nation according to
Crow and Smykla. This rapid deployment meant little research had been conducted on the
BWCs; therefore, there was no clear understanding of whether the technology could deliver the
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expected results (Groff et al., 2020). Lum et al. espouse that if such a significant investment is to
be made to direct change, some research should be performed to back up the investment.
Furthermore, they maintain that police technology is notorious for not delivering the anticipated
outcome. Nonetheless, the cameras have deployed across thousands of police agencies
nationwide and the curtailment of officer activities is being felt with many cities seeing a rise in
crime (Hyland, 2018; Wallace et al., 2018; Wolfe & Nix, 2016).
Other scholars have agreed that such technologies have had unintended consequences for
everyone involved, including the police officers, their department, and the citizens they serve
(Chan et al., 2001; Koper et al., 2015). Lum et al. (2019), assert that most technological
outcomes are spawned by human factors, including an officer’s acceptance or rejection of the
technology, the policy and procedures surrounding the technology, and citizen agreeableness.
Koper et al. reiterate that although the technology is available, some devices do not always
produce advancements in communication, collaboration, output, job satisfaction, or other
effective means of reducing crime or improving police-citizen relationships. They further this
and say that with any new technology, there are kinks to work through and refinements to be
made, which is done over time. They claim changes that BWCs are expected to bring to policing
will not be achieved instantaneously or even as fast as the BWCs were rolled out. Finally, they
presume adequate planning and reasonable outcomes, and expectations can only make BWCs
successful and beneficial to police departments and communities.
Recent examination suggests officers are curtailing their activity. De-policing was seen
after the Rodney King incident, but not to the level the nation has experience in recent years
(Wolfe & Nix, 2016). They say officers are keenly aware of the unconstructive exposure that
encompasses their profession when it is viewed by millions on conventional and social media
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daily. Officers are cognizant of the possibility their behavior and actions will be filmed,
therefore, officers become less enthusiastic to perform their job fearing they, too, will be accused
of something that is unjust according to Wolfe and Nix. They speculate officers are pulling back
in providing police services, thus resulting in higher crime rates. The tapering of activity may
vary per location and is not just officers failing to conduct traffic stops or initiate contact with
suspicious persons as there is more that goes into crime reduction (Shjarback et al., 2017;
Wallace et al., 2018). Wolfe and Nix understand policing is a partnership with the community to
address crime issues and when there is a breakdown, officers are less motivated to work with the
public out of fear of public perception.
When the media saturates the headlines with unflattering police-citizen interactions it can
cause some officers to pull back in self-initiated activities (Wolfe & Nix, 2016). This recipe
ultimately damages the relationship between the police and communities they serve. Prior
research on BWCs focused primarily on topics such as the number of arrests, citations issued,
use of force incidents, and number of complaints an officer accumulated throughout their career,
but not a pattern of behavior (Johnson & Lafrance, 2016). There is no defined metric in which
scholars refer when analyzing proactive initiatives with activity and behavior subjective and hard
to measure (Bonkiewicz, 2017). Adding BWCs to the mix can make the measurements even
more difficult.
Looking back at the career stage theory, Bonkiewicz (2017), revealed a negative
correlation in each of the above listed topics across all four stages of an officer’s career.
Meaning, that officer activity started high and as time progressed the officer’s activity level
steadily decreased until they reached the end of their career. However, Johnson & Lafrance
(2016), found their results to be curvilinear with the productivity on the rise during the first two
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stages as the officer’s career is ramping up with a decrease in productivity in the last two stages.
The bottom line is the results are inconsistent and they do not include BWCs in the analysis. A
contributing factor to these inconsistent results rest in how scholars distinguish and define
productivity. What these results do not assess is whether the addition of BWCs significantly
reduce police activity. This study seeks to examine if there is a significant decline in police
proactivity, subsequent the deployment of BWCs.
Bonkiewicz (2017) has found issues among studies when describing the metrics that refer
to officer productivity. Bonkiewicz furthers this by stating there are copious amounts of patrol
activities that go unaccounted for and categories such as arrests are not weighted. He conceives a
felony arrest is more time consuming, thus requiring more investigation, than a traffic stop for a
speeding motorist. Moreover, he supposes officers who assist other officers, write more detailed
reports, and investigate incidents in full reduce the amount of time that could be used for issuing
citations, making misdemeanor arrests, or conducting police work that is deemed proactive.
Bonkiewicz concludes that officers who deliver more outputs may not necessarily be more
productive officers, they may just be afforded more time for self-initiated activities or proactive
undertakings.
Have BWCs constrained officers to the point they are curtailing enforcement, thus
allowing the crime rates to increase? This study seeks to discover if officers are in fact curtailing
self-initiated activities more after the deployment of BWCs and if this curtailment is contributing
to a rise in crime. De-policing is the notion that officers withdraw, retreat, or pull away from law
enforcement actions out of fear of scrutiny or discipline (Lum et al., 2019; Oliver, 2017; Wallace
et al., 2018). Ferguson’s Chief Dotson made the comment during a dialogue regarding an uptick
in violent crime since the Michael Brown incident that seemed to correspond with a decrease in
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arrests across the city (Gonzales & Cochran, 2017). Though Chief Dotson was not specific, the
term, “Ferguson Effect”, implied a reduction in officer self-initiative and the escalation of
violence due to the longstanding grievances between police practices and the African American
community according to Gonzales and Cochran.
De-policing is nothing new, in fact, it was observed shortly after the Rodney King
incident in the 1990s and again in Cincinnati after the 2001 riots involving the shooting death of
an unarmed teen (Oliver, 2017). Oliver reveals three months following the Cincinnati riots there
was a 50% decrease in arrests and more than a 50% decrease in self-initiated traffic stops. Two
years following the riots, Cincinnati experienced a vast increase in crime for the next 24 months
according to Oliver. Oliver claims that although de-policing has been around for decades it was
first viewed as a positive form of policing as it allowed communities to police themselves and
not be overly dependent upon police resources. He reiterates that in recent years de-policing has
developed a negative connotation that is proving to be of concern for police management as it
has spawned serious repercussions. Those repercussions are reduced police-citizen relationships,
a breakdown in trust with community members, lost revenue, and an increase in crime. There
have been very few studies conducted to assess officer proactivity and its relationship to BWCs
states Oliver. Moreover, Oliver espouses the methodologies that have been exercised are not
consistent with one another, therefore the end results have been mixed and are not generalizable.
The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2017) defines police
proactivity as:
policing strategies that have as one of their goals the prevention and reduction of crime
and disorder and are not reactive in terms of focusing on uncovering ongoing crime or on
investigating or responding to crimes once they have occurred (p. 30).
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Lum et al. (2019) define proactivity as "problem-solving, stop-question-frisk, traffic
enforcement, community policing and engagement efforts, directed patrol, or the use of
misdemeanor arrests to reduce disorder” (p. 101-102). Traffic stops are considered by many
agencies as self-initiated enforcement activities that can reduce speeding on public roadways and
reduce traffic accidents that claim the lives of thousands each year (Lum et al., 2020). Other selfinitiatives include initiating communication with suspicious persons or making oneself
noticeable in high-crime areas which has been found to discourage would-be criminals and
increase police-citizen relationships that foster trust (Wu & Lum, 2017; Lum et al., 2020). This
lack of proactivity may be caused in part by BWCs because some officers are apprehensive to
the possibility of scrutiny; therefore, officers refrain from proactively engaging with any
members of the public. A study published in 2019, by Lum et al., found non-defined results from
six previous studies that addressed BWCs and officer curtailment. Additionally, they say some of
the findings indicated an increase in self-initiated activities, whereas others found no difference
in the number of traffic stops initiated. Conversely, Lum and associates claim a study conducted
in 2018 found officers initiating citizen inquiries declined over time, but more so for those who
displayed a camera.
It is no surprise that many individuals act differently when they know they are on camera
or being watched. This is true for even public officials, hence the reason some judges do not
allow cameras in the courtroom (Gonzalez & Cochran, 2017). The goal of the camera is to
capture police-citizens encounters; however, it does not always provide a full account of the
officer’s physical actions. Gonzales and Cochran say the BWCs do ascertain what is said
between the officer and the citizen and the citizen’s reaction to the officer’s commands. They
further this and state that BWCs record the officer's decisions, which could be why some officers
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feel they have lost some of the discretion they once had. Moreover, the public feels the police are
more unforgiving, thus issuing more citations and enacting arrests which is contrary to what
many scholars have discovered (Lum et al., 2019).
Subjectivity may also be contributing to the phenomenon of de-policing. The BWCs are
sometimes referred to as double-edged, capturing only the visual and audible portions of a scene,
not the totality of the situation (St. Louis et al., 2019). The premise behind the BWCs is to see
how the officer is performing his duties, however, this is not always achieved. The BWCs are
typically mounted on a police officer's uniform, either centered on the chest or shoulder (Boivin
et al., 2017). This vantage point does not show what the officer is doing most of the time because
the lens is facing away from the officer. This perspective conjures up bias, and preconceived
notions as the camera cannot identify the events that are evolving or hidden in the peripheral
(McKay & Lee, 2020). McKay and Lee believe that unless captured on fellow BWCs, the
filming officer is often absent from the scene altogether due to his position behind the camera.
They say this contradicts the desire for transparency as the officer in question is behind the
camera, not in front of it and this lack of footage can lead to subjective scrutiny. Others,
including the public and those in the officer's chain of command, are left to fill in the gaps and
postulate what might have occurred, leaving the officer feeling untrusted or fearful their word
will not be enough (Boivin et al., 2017). The camera is not the all-inclusive tool many speculated
it would be and there is still much that remains unknown (Lum et al., 2019; Mirzoeff, 2006).
Perspective, the camera’s point of view, a person’s morals, values, upbringing, and belief
system play a significant role in how the camera's images are perceived (Boivin et al., 2017;
Gonzales & Cochran, 2017). The Scott v. Harris experiment is an example of how videos may be
viewed, or scrutinized, differently dependent upon the viewer. There were significant differences
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of opinion among the participant sample who viewed the video involving the encounter between
Officer Scott and Victor Harris, where Officer Scott forced Harris’ vehicle from the roadway
causing severe bodily injury to Harris (Boivin et al., 2017; Gonzalez & Cochran, 2017).
According to Gonzales and Cochran, the sample consisted of different races, political
backgrounds, education, and wage status and what the experiment revealed was that there were
significant differences among the sample as to the proposed level of risk Harris presented to the
public. This indicates that even though the footage from BWCs may be available to deliver the
officer's factual account of events, it still does not guarantee those who decide guilt or innocence
will agree. How a person views or interprets the footage will coincide with their perception of
law enforcement (Schumm, 2017). Schumm says bias comes with the camera's perspective and
those in favor of the police will favor the officer and his camera's perspective. Romans 12:2
proclaims, “Do not be conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewal of your mind,
that by testing you may discern what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect”
(English Standard Version). As Gonzales and Cochran discussed, the study involving Officer
Scott and Victor Harris had a mix of responses. Who is there to say there is only one right
answer? The door on citizen-police relations is now unlocked and open to conversation. Both
the police and the public should welcome suggestions concerning police reform. Romans verse
12:2 reminds us that we should use our minds and ask questions so as not to conform.
The discontent for police across the nation has resulted in acts of violence and violent
protests, often rendering police tactics useless (Gonzales & Cochran, 2017). In 2015, Gonzales
and Cochran espoused that media headlines across the country were flouting the dramatic rise in
violent crime, most notably murder; however, the articles did not relate this rise to a decrease in
policing. They said that although officials attributed the increase in crime to emboldened
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criminals and the scrutiny officers were facing in the media, several experts in the field debunked
this theory. They claim James Comey, former FBI Director, went so far as to suggest that police
are pulling back due to the backlash and viral videos spread across multiple media venues.
Summary
Policing has undergone numerous changes since the Michael Brown shooting death in
2014, an incident that was not captured on any BWCs. Citizens demanded change to both the
police profession and the police culture. Those with the power to implement change heard the
cries from the public and responded swiftly by placing thousands of cameras into the hands of
hundreds of police agencies. Many agencies have mandated officers wear BWCs while on duty
with the aim that officers will resist the urge to use excessive force and make fair decisions. The
cameras were to bring about accountability and legitimacy and improve the public’s trust, but
they were quickly rolled out without much research. It has been almost seven years since the
BWCs have been heavily introduced and the studies surrounding the BWCs are continuing to
pour in. Initially, agencies found the cameras useful, reducing use of force incidents, reducing
citizen complaints, and reducing arrests which has been touted by numerous scholars and studies.
As time has passed, adverse effects of the cameras are beginning to present themselves.
There are studies that have shown officers who wear a camera are more likely to be
assaulted than those who do not. Also, officers killed in the line of duty has escalated immensely
in recent years. Additionally, the crime rate is rising so fast that some cities are experiencing
triple digit homicide rates in a matter of months. Combining these incidents with negative social
and conventional media attacks on police and what the nation has is a police force who is pulling
back, curtailing enforcement duties caused by the fear of discipline, indictment, and death.
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The cameras have provided some positive aspects and have received an abundance of
support since their inception; strengthening public trust, permitting citizens to have a police
officer’s perspective of events, and the cameras have reduced conflict (McKay & Lee, 2020;
Taylor et al., 2017). Taylor et al. presumes citizens, various stakeholders, police officers and
even suspects have condoned the use of BWCs. However, it has yet to be decided if the
positives outweigh the negatives. Are the cameras restricting officers from conducting their
duties consequently creating an uptick in crime? Deterrence theory hypothesizes that individuals
will contemplate risk with reward to avoid punishment (Demir et al., 2020). Heightened levels
of officer scrutiny and the public’s demand for the footage to be released has put police officers
on the defensive with many officers deterred from initiating any citizen contact (Adams &
Mastracci, 2019; Bush, 2020). Another theory behind BWCs is the self-awareness theory. Selfawareness theory espouses that individuals will feel compelled to conform to social norms and
exhibit their best behavior when others are watching, however, this is not always the case (Ariel
et al., 2018; Demir et al., 2020). Scholars believe the camera has spawned violence on the part of
the citizen, especially when drugs or alcohol are involved, or the individual suffers from mental
illness (McKay & Lee, 2020). If this is the case, then the camera is only keeping the officer in
check.
Romans 12: 17 states, “Never pay back evil with more evil. Do things in such a way that
everyone can see you are honorable” (New Living Translation). The solution to the current
displeasure with the police is not a camera, nor does the solution lie with additional deaths or
crimes, but an open dialogue to discuss concerns and foster relationships. The long-standing
injustices, the alleged ill-treatment by police, and discontent felt by many Americans, mainly
African Americans, have fueled individuals and groups to lash out and express their
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dissatisfaction with the police (Gonzales & Cochran, 2017). Officers are responding to this
lashing by pulling back and curtailing proactive initiatives to save their careers.
The learning theory posits that individuals in similar situations will modify their behavior
after observing what others experience (Mayes, 2015). The publicity of police officers standing
trial, being subjected to murder and manslaughter charges can discourage other officers from
initiating contact with those in the community as they do not want to be the next viral video. The
career-stage theory attempts to explain the decrease in police proactive initiatives and is a
plausible theory in the police profession as it states that as time goes on an officer’s activity will
decrease, but in today’s hostile environment it is believed the decrease will be seen more rapidly.
To date, numerous studies have been conducted on BWCs, but there is still no clear
consensus that the cameras are living up to its expectations or providing communities with better
policing. This study strives to add to the body of knowledge by analyzing officer proactivity
levels before and after the BWCs by narrowing in and establishing a clear definition of officer
proactivity as it relates to the definition maintained by The National Academies of Sciences,
Engineering, and Medicine. Furthermore, the study will examine the crime rate over the same
time period to determine if there is a correlation to officer activity level and the crime rate.

65
CHAPTER THREE: METHODS
Overview
The summer of 2014 was a turning point for both citizens and the police culture. The
officer-involved shooting death of Michael Brown and many other controversial, high-profile
incidents involving the police and citizens brought to light the need for change (Wallace et al.,
2018). They tout a major investment in BWCs was launched as a tool to improve police
legitimacy and build trust between the pubic and police. However, crime rates have been rising
throughout most of the United States after being on a downward trajectory for the last two
decades (Gross & Mann, 2017). Gross and other scholars state that recent anti-police protests
across the nation may be causing officers to refrain from public interaction, thus giving criminals
openings to commit crimes. This phenomenon has been labeled the “Ferguson Effect” that was
described in chapter two. The study seeks to determine if officers conducting proactive initiatives
have declined since the implementation of BWCs using a quantitative design and archived data.
Furthermore, the proposed study will attempt to determine the relationship between officer
proactivity levels and the crime rate.
This chapter will present the methodology employed for the study. It will begin with a
description of the design, why the planned design is the most appropriate, and the type of data
that will be analyzed. It addresses the research questions and the potential outcomes as illustrated
in the hypothesis. Additionally, this chapter will discuss the participants and how they will be
selected for the study, and the sample size. The chapter will conclude with the instrumentation to
be used when collecting the data, the procedures to be employed, including the Institutional
Review Board (IRB) process. The rationale behind the statistical analysis will be to determine if
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officer proactive initiatives have declined since BWCs were distributed throughout the agency
and the correlation to the Part I crime rate.
Design
This study will examine two objectives. The first objective will be to determine if officer
proactivity decreased after BWCs were issued, and the second objective will be to determine if
there is a correlation to the Part I crime rate. The design will implement a pre-post
nonexperimental quantitative analysis using archived data. Archived data is data that is already
in existence before any hypothesis was constructed and, therefore, was not produced by the
researcher (Vogt et al., 2012; Weston et al., 2019). Quantitative studies begin with a theory and
use numbers and variables to analyze and determine the results (Mohanjan, 2020). Moreover,
the chief advantage of a quantitative study is that it measures the responses of many using a
limited set of data, thus allowing the researcher to compare and assemble data so that results can
be generalizable (Barkman, 2002).
A pre-post nonexperimental quantitative analysis has been chosen to calculate the
number of officer self-initiatives before and after BWCs. This analysis will determine if officer
proactivity has decreased after BWCs were implemented. The independent variable in this study
is the body-worn camera. The study will examine two dependent variables to include officer selfinitiated activity and traffic stops. Officer activities are coded in the computer-aided dispatch
(CAD) system to show if the call came from dispatch, the officer self-initiated, or the officer
conducted a conducted a traffic stop. Calls will be coded using a dummy variable 1 for those
activities initiated by the officer and 0 for the calls sent by dispatch. The second measure, traffic
stops, will be coded using the dummy variable 2.
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Additionally, a correlational design will be used to determine the relationship between
the volume of officer proactive initiatives and the Part I crime rate. Correlational research
designs are used to evaluate two or more variables and the relationship, if any, they have on one
another (Seeram, 2019). He goes on to state that “correlational research is a type of
nonexperimental research that facilitates prediction and explanation of the relationship among
variables” (p. 176). Additionally, he espoused correlational designs can detect both the strength
and direction of a relationship which is the purpose of this study. The dependent variables will be
officer self-initiated activities and traffic stops.
Randomized controlled trial experiments are the preferred method when determining the
impact a program has on the participants and are considered the gold standard in research design
(Wong & Steiner, 2018). However, they suggest nonexperimental methods are just as beneficial
when determining the effect of an intervention. The terms preexisting data and archived data are
sometimes used interchangeably, with both terms indicating the researcher did not obtain the
data first-hand (Mohanjan, 2020). He also explains preexisting can mean the data was gathered
by another researcher and may have been manipulated. In this study, the data to be obtained is
raw data that has not been manipulated. This researcher chose to use the term archived to denote
the data being requested was already in existence and has not been altered by any previous
studies.
Nonexperimental designs rely on archived data to describe a group of individuals
(Salkind, 2010). The most used databases to facilitate such designs include the Bureau of
Census, Centers for Disease Control, and the National Center for Educational Statistics (Vogt et
al., 2012). Using archived data in a nonexperimental design is most appropriate because it
allowed the researcher to gather authentic data. Additionally, this type of data is used when there

68
are time constraints or the time has passed, prohibiting the researcher from collecting the
information first-hand like an experimental study. The purpose is to determine if the volume of
officer proactivity declined after BWCs were introduced. Obtaining data at three points in time
will give better insight into whether officer proactivity decreased after the BWCs were deployed
and, if so, how extensively. This analysis was then compared to the crime rates during the same
time frames to determine a correlation.
To demonstrate how this study will be constructed, a study was similarly fashioned by a
group of researchers in 2019, using archived data and then determining the correlation of
violence against police officers since the Michael Brown shooting death in 2014 (White et al.,
2018). They assessed the dangerousness of policing by relying on the number of line-of-duty
deaths across the country dating back to 1970 and ending in December 2016. These scholars
sought to determine if the current OIS deaths, primarily involving minorities, sparked an increase
in officers being killed. They utilized archived data from the Officer Down Memorial Page. They
found officer line-of-duty deaths to have decreased dramatically since the 1970s with no
significant correlation to line-of-duty deaths and OIS incidents, given the volatile relationship
between citizens and police.
There have been few studies that have analyzed police proactivity and the correlation to
the crime rate. The phenomenon of the rise in crime across the nation, media scrutiny of the
police, and a decrease in police proactivity has been dubbed the “Ferguson Effect” (Shjarback et
al., 2017). These scholars analyzed archived data from across the state of Missouri beginning in
2014 and ending in 2015 to determine if police officer productivity decreased after the shooting
death of Michael Brown in 2014. They found many police agencies had a noteworthy reduction
in traffic stops performed in 2015 than in 2014, while violent crime rose. Consequently, the
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authors stated, “something was indeed occurring among Missouri law enforcement agencies that
resulted in such a major shift in police behavior, and it appears consistent with the “Ferguson
Effect” argument” (p. 47).
Research Questions
The problem with BWCs is that they were rolled out in mass numbers without much
research, thus contributing to undesirable results (Ariel et al., 2018; Rowe et al., 2018; Wallace
et al., 2018). For example, Ariel uncovered that a study across several agencies found an increase
in assaults on police officers who were wearing a camera. They believe BWCs can cause overdeterrence in officers, which is when the camera induces an officer to display more socially
acceptable behavior to avoid potential discipline by their agency. They go on to say the officer’s
politeness is perceived by the suspect as being weak and feeble. Additionally, many studies have
shown that officers say the cameras make them feel like they must do everything by the book
and their discretion has been reduced, therefore, officers are making more arrests and issuing
more citations (Ariel et al., 2017;Koen et al., 2019; Rowe et al., 2018). This can be a
disadvantage to law enforcement as it may breed resentment toward officers for enforcing the
law, and in economically troubled communities that have a high level of informal social control
trust and legitamacy can be eroded (Hughes et al., 2020).
Examining officer-initiated traffic stops and officer self-initiated activities before and
after the implementation of BWCs will provide greater insight into how BWCs impact an
officer’s willingness to engage with citizens and how this willingness to interact impacts the
crime rate. The purpose of this study is to determine if officer-initiated traffic stops and selfinitiated activities have declined since the deployment of BWCs using data from a large
metropolitan police agency in the Southern region of the United States. Additionally, the study
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will assess a correlation between the volume of officer proactive initiatives and the Part I crime
rate. The following questions are addressed in this study.
RQ1: What is the difference in the number of traffic stops after BWCs were deployed?
RQ2: What is the difference in the number of self-initiated activities after BWCs were
deployed?
RQ3: What is the relationship between traffic stops and the Part I crime rate before and
after BWCs were deployed?
RQ4: What is the relationship between officer self-initiated activities and the Part I
crime rate before and after BWCs were deployed?
RQ5: What is the relationship between the number of officer proactive initiatives and
their career progression?
Hypotheses
RQ1: What is the difference in the number of traffic stops after BWCs were deployed?
•

H01: There is no statistically significant difference in the number of traffic stops conducted
by first-line patrol officers after implementing BWCs, as shown by the paired sample t-test.

•

Ha1: There is a statistically significant difference in the number of traffic stops conducted by
first-line patrol officers after implementing BWCs.
RQ2: What is the difference in the number of self-initiated activities after BWCs were

deployed?
•

H02: There is no statistically significant difference in the number of self-initiated patrol
activities conducted by first-line patrol officers after implementing BWCs, as shown by the
paired sample t-test.
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•

Ha2: There is a statistically significant difference in the number of self-initiated patrol
activities conducted by first-line patrol officers after implementing BWCs.
RQ3: What is the relationship between traffic stops and the Part I crime rate before and
after BWCs were deployed?

•

H03: There is no correlation between the volume of traffic stops and the crime rate, as shown
by Pearson’s rho correlation coefficient.

•

Ha3: There is a significant correlation between the volume of traffic stops and the crime rate.
RQ4: What is the relationship between officer self-initiated activities and the Part I

crime rate before and after BWCs were deployed?
•

H04: There is no correlation between the volume of self-initiated patrol activities and the
crime rate, as shown by Pearson’s rho correlation coefficient.

•

Ha4: There is a significant correlation between the volume of self-initiated patrol activities
and the crime rate
RQ5: What is the relationship between the number of officer proactive initiatives and

their career progression?
•

H05: There is no statistically significant relationship between the number of officer proactive
initiatives and their career progression.

•

Ha5: There is a statistically significant relationship between the number of officer proactive
initiatives and their career progression.
Participants and Setting
The study will garner participants from a non-probability convenience sample of patrol

officers from a large police agency located in the Southern region of the United States. The
police agency is situated in a culturally diverse metropolitan city home to numerous colleges,
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universities, and professional sports teams. This agency provides law enforcement services to
more than one million residents. The agency not only provides patrol services but has numerous
specialized divisions in which to investigate specific crimes. There are multiple levels in the
chain of command. However, only first-line patrol officers, first-line supervisors, and tactical
units are mandated to wear BWCs.
This study will analyze data from only those officers assigned to a patrol capacity. Patrol
is defined as officers who are assigned marked police vehicles, and their primary duty is to
respond to calls for service that are prompted by the public calling 911 or a non-emergency line.
Additionally, these officers have the discretion to initiate traffic stops when time and probable
cause exist. Furthermore, these officers may self-initiate proactive initiatives during their shift,
making contact with individuals to inquire or prevent criminal activity or self-initiate in a
specific location to investigate or deter illegal activity.
This study will seek to analyze the proactivity of 1455 patrol officers from a single police
agency before and after BWCs were distributed. This sample size significantly exceeds the
minimum required for a medium effect size. According to Panter et al. (2011), a sample size of
128 is needed for a medium effect size (r = .3) and a statical power of .8. Additionally, they state
a minimum sample size of 128 is necessary when assuming a Type I error rate of .05 (alpha) and
when conducting a paired sample t-test. The sample will include officers working various shifts.
The data to be acquired for the pre body-worn camera data set will be from April 1-June 30,
2014. Data for the post body-worn camera data set will be April 1-June 30, 2017 and 2019. This
agency has five shifts in which an officer can work depending on the district they are assigned.
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Instrumentation
The instrumentation for this study is archived data from the selected police agency’s
work card system showing the work product from a randomly selected group of first-line patrol
officers at three points in time. The first point in time being a three-month interval (April 1-June
30) in 2014, before the agency assigned BWCs to all first-line patrol officers. A few pilot
programs were conducted throughout the agency in 2014; however, the officers selected had not
been issued a camera. The second interval consisted of the same officer’s work product from
2017 (April 1-June 30), just weeks after BWCs were fully implemented for all patrol officers
throughout the agency. The researcher also collected data from April 1, 2019-June 30, 2019,
more than two years after BWCs had been in full operation for first-line patrol officers to
determine if a trend existed.
Vogt et al. (2012), explain that archived data is that which has not been manipulated or
produced by the current researcher and may come in numerical records. They go on to state that
archived data that the researcher has not created can contain flaws such as missing and
incomplete data. The data for this study was generated from the officer’s work cards. The
officer's work card is a handwritten or electronic form that officers, themselves, fill out
throughout their shift, documenting their work activity. The work card is then manually entered
by a department employee (not the officer). It shows various entries, including the officer's calls
for service, self-initiated activity, arrests, number of offense reports written, traffic stops,
citations issued, and other various categories.
To determine if officer proactivity declined after the implementation of BWCs, the
overall number of proactive initiatives, which included self-initiative and traffic stops, will be
counted for each time interval, and compared. Additionally, the officer’s self-initiatives and
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traffic stops will be analyzed separately for the group to determine if there is a decrease in any
one initiative after BWCs were deployed. Furthermore, these findings will be compared to Part I
crimes that occurred throughout the agency’s patrol area during the same time frames to
determine if there is an impact on the crime rate in that area.
Procedures
The researcher will complete the University's Institutional Review Board (IRB)
application process before obtaining data. The researcher did not expect to have any ethical
concerns as the archived data was sanitized so that the officers could not be identified. Following
IRB approval, the researcher sent a request for the data, including the parameters necessary to
conduct the study. Using the agency's request for information form, the researcher requested a
sample of officers who completed all field training and were no longer considered probationary
status. Officers were assigned to patrol during the specified time frames and not issued a camera
before 2017. The total number of self-initiated patrol activities, traffic stops, and years of service
were requested for each corresponding officer. The agency determined which officers were in
patrol without a camera in 2014 and were still assigned as a patrol unit, with a camera, in 2017
and 2019. The officers were coded numerically by the agency and retained the same coded
number for each time interval was analyzed.
The data was collected and downloaded into a spreadsheet. Any obvious outliers were
discarded. The information was then downloaded into SPSS version 23, and the means and
standard deviations were calculated for each time frame. Likewise, Part I crimes were also
downloaded into a spreadsheet, and the means for each period were be calculated. The data was
compared to determine if officer proactivity declined after BWCs were issued and the correlation
to the Part I crime rate for each time interval.
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Data Analysis
Initially, this study utilized a paired sample t-test and Pearson’s rho correlation
coefficient. The paired sampled t-test was selected to determine a difference between the same
group of officers at different time intervals. According to Kremelberg (2011), this test is used
when determining whether a significant increase or decrease exists within the same group at
differing points in time. However, the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for Medians was more
appropriate. The purpose of Pearson’s rho correlation coefficient is to establish whether there is a
meaningful relationship between variables. This study will utilize Pearson's rho correlation
coefficient to determine if there is a significant relationship between the average number of
officer proactive initiatives and the Part I crimes.
H01: There is no statistically significant difference in the number of traffic stops conducted by
first-line patrol officers after implementing BWCs, as shown by the paired sample t-test.
H02: There is no statistically significant difference in the number of self-initiated patrol
activities conducted by first-line patrol officers after implementing BWCs, as shown by the
paired sample t-test.
H03: There is no correlation between the volume of traffic stops and the crime rate, as shown by
Pearson's rho correlation coefficient.
H04: There is no correlation between the volume of self-initiated patrol activities and the crime
rate, as shown by Pearson's rho correlation coefficient.
H05: There is no statistically significant relationship between the number of officer proactive
initiatives and their career progression.
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Summary
Chapter three discussed the methodology to be used to conduct this proposed research
study. The proposed research design consists of a non-probability convenience sample of patrol
officers from a large police agency located in the Southern region of the United States.
Moreover, the research questions and hypotheses were discussed. The data used for this study
was archived data, so the researcher anticipated no ethical issues. Additionally, the data was
anonymized before collection so that no officer’s identity was to be divulged. Lastly, the paired
sample t-test and Pearson's rho correlation coefficient analysis was to be used to determine if
officer proactivity has declined since the deployment of BWCs over time and the correlation, if
any, to Part I crimes. However, the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for Medians was more
appropriate due to distributions being skewed.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS
Overview
The purpose of this study was to determine if officer proactive initiatives, specifically
traffic stops and self-initiated activities, have declined significantly since the deployment of
BWCs using data from a large, metropolitan police agency in the Southern United States that
services more than one million citizens. Additionally, the study sought to assess if there was a
significant relationship between officer proactive initiatives and crime rates. Mentioned in
previous chapters, there has not been enough research conducted to determine if BWCs are a
factor for officers contemplating proactive enforcement and self-initiated citizen contact. This
study will contribute to the body of knowledge and narrow the gap.
The research questions and hypotheses were as follows:
RQ1: What is the difference in the number of traffic stops after BWCs were deployed?
•

H01: There is no statistically significant difference in the number of traffic stops conducted
by first-line patrol officers after implementing BWCs.

•

Ha1: There is a statistically significant difference in the number of traffic stops conducted by
first-line patrol officers after implementing BWCs.
RQ2: What is the difference in the number of self-initiated activities after BWCs were

deployed?
•

H02: There is no statistically significant difference in the number of self-initiated patrol
activities conducted by first-line patrol officers after implementing BWCs.

•

Ha2: There is a statistically significant difference in the number of self-initiated patrol
activities conducted by first-line patrol officers after implementing BWCs.

78
RQ3: What is the relationship between traffic stops and the Part I crime rate before and
after BWCs were deployed?
•

H03: There is no correlation between the volume of traffic stops and the crime rate.

•

Ha3: There is a significant correlation between the volume of traffic stops and the crime rate.
RQ4: What is the relationship between officer self-initiated activities and the Part I

crime rate before and after BWCs were deployed?
•

H04: There is no correlation between the volume of self-initiated patrol activities and the
crime rate.

•

Ha4: There is a significant correlation between the volume of self-initiated patrol activities
and the crime rate
RQ5: What is the relationship between the number of officer proactive initiatives and

their career progression?
•

H05: There is no statistically significant relationship between the number of officer proactive
initiatives and their career progression.

•

Ha5: There is a statistically significant relationship between the number of officer proactive
initiatives and their career progression.
Chapter four is organized by a discussion of the descriptive statistics, including the

sample demographics, and a summary of the results discussing the research question/hypothesis
testing that was conducted for each question/hypothesis. The researcher analyzed the data using
SPSS 23 for Windows and Microsoft Excel.
Descriptive Statistics
The sample consisted of archived data from April 1– June 30 of 2014, 2017, and 2019
using 1,455 anonymized police officers who were assigned to patrol during the aforementioned
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timeframes. The same set of officers were then tracked throughout the study. The sample of
1,455 police officers ranged from ages 21 to 45 (M = 27.90, SD = 4.78) when they were sworn
into the participating agency with a median age of 27.00. Ninety percent of the sample (n =
1,310) were males and 10.0% (n = 145) were females. In 2014, 40.8% (n = 593) of officers had
0-5 years on the force, 27.1% (n = 394) had 6-10 years, and 32.1% (n = 467) had 11 years or
more. Officer tenure range in 2014 is presented in Table 1.
Table 1
Officer Tenure Range in 2014
Tenure Range
N

Missing
Total

0-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21+
Total
Data

593
394
182
259
26
1,454
1
1,455

%
40.8
27.1
12.5
17.8
1.8
99.9
0.1
100.0

Valid %
40.8
27.1
12.5
17.8
1.8
100.0

Cumulative %
40.8
67.9
80.4
98.2
100.0

In 2019, 4.7% (n = 69) of the officers had 0-5 years on the force, 36.3% (n = 528) had 610 years, and 58.9% (n = 857) had 11 years or more. Officer tenure range in 2019 is presented in
Table 2.
Table 2
Officer Tenure Range in 2019
Tenure Range
N

Missing
Total

0-5
6-10
11-15
16-20
21+
Total
Data

69
528
391
181
285
1454
1
1455

%
4.7
36.3
26.9
12.4
19.6
99.9
0.1
100.0

Valid %
4.7
36.3
26.9
12.4
19.6
100.0

Cumulative %
4.7
41.1
68.0
80.4
100.0
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The police agency that participated in the study provided Part I Crime data in a summary
format. Part I crimes are considered the most serious crimes that are committed frequently
throughout the United States according to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Program,
therefore, they are the crimes most likely to be reported to law enforcement (U.S. Department of
Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2010). These crimes consist of murder, rape, aggravated
assault, robbery, motor vehicle theft, and arson. The researcher calculated percentages of specific
Type I Crimes for each year and then conducted chi-square goodness of fit tests to determine if
significant differences existed for each crime by year. Next, the results were illustrated in a
clustered bar graph. The data were limited to April-June of 2014, 2017, and 2019.
These timeframes were significant because the first point in time was a three-month
interval (April 1-June 30) in 2014, before the agency assigned BWCs to all first-line patrol
officers. A few pilot programs were conducted throughout the agency prior to 2014; however,
the officers selected for this study had not been issued a camera until 2017. Additionally, the OIS
death of Michael Brown had not yet occurred. The second interval consisted of the same
officer’s work product from 2017 (April 1-June 30), just weeks after BWCs were fully
implemented for all patrol officers throughout the agency. The researcher also collected data
from April 1, 2019-June 30, 2019, more than two years after BWCs had been in full operation
for first-line patrol officers to determine if a trend existed. Type I Crimes are presented in Table
3.
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Table 3
Type I Crimes from April-June
Crime
Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter
Rape
Aggravated Assault
Auto Theft
Burglary
Robbery
Total

2014 (N, %)
54 (0.37)
228 (1.6)
2,865 (19.6)
3,579 (24.5)
5,573 (38.1)
2,323 (15.9)
14,622 (100)

2017 (N, %)
69 (0.50)
365 (2.6)
3,855 (27.8)
2,958 (21.4)
4,204 (30.4)
2,395 (17.3)
13,846 (100)

2019 (N, %)
66 (0.47)
323 (2.3)
3,218 (23.1)
3,562 (25.6)
4,393 (31.5)
2,363 (17.0)
13,925 (100)

Note. Data are from April-June of each year.

Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter from April-June
For the aforementioned timeframes, there were 189 murders and non-negligent
manslaughters. Assuming that there were no significant differences in each year for reported
crimes, we would expect that there were 63 incidents per year (189/3). In 2014, there were 54
murders and non-negligent manslaughter incidents, in 2017, there were 69, and in 2019, there
were 66. These differences were not statistically significant, X2(N = 189) = 2.00, p = .368.
Rape from April-June
There were 916 reported rapes from April-June. Assuming that there were no significant
differences in each year for reported rapes, we would expect that there were 305.33 rapes per
year (916/3). In 2014, there were 228 reported rapes, in 2017, there were 365, and in 2019, there
were 323. There was a significant difference in the number of reported rapes relative to each
year, X2(N = 916) = 45.87, p < .001.
Aggravated Assault from April-June
There were 9,938 aggravated assaults from April-June. Assuming that there were no
significant differences in each year for aggravated assaults, we would expect that there were
3,312.67 aggravated assaults per year (9,938/3). In 2014, there were 2,865 aggravated assaults, in

82
2017, there were 3,855, and in 2019, there were 3,218. There was a significant difference in the
number of aggravated assaults relative to each year, X2(N = 9,938) = 45.87, p < .001.
Auto Theft from April-June
There were 10,099 auto thefts from April-June. Assuming that there were no significant
differences in each year for auto thefts, we would expect that there were 3,366.33 auto thefts per
year (10,099/3). In 2014, there were 3,579 auto thefts, in 2017, there were 2,958, and in 2019,
there were 3,562. There was a significant difference in the number of auto thefts relative to each
year, X2(N = 10,099) = 74.34, p < .001.
Burglary from April-June
There were 14,170 burglaries from April-June. Assuming that there were no significant
differences in each year for burglaries, we would expect that there were 4,723.33 burglaries per
year (14,170/3). In 2014, there were 5,573 burglaries, in 2017, there were 4,204, and in 2019,
there were 4,393. There was a significant difference in the number of burglaries relative to each
year, X2(N = 14,170) = 233.05, p < .001.
Robbery from April-June
There were 7,081 robberies from April-June. Assuming that there were no significant
differences in each year for robberies, we would expect that there were 2,360.33 robberies per
year (7,081/3). In 2014, there were 2,323 robberies, in 2017, there were 2,395, and in 2019, there
were 2,363. There was no significant difference in the number of robberies relative to each year,
X2(N = 7,081) = 1.10, p = .576.
Total Part I Crimes from April-June
There were 42,393 total Part I Crimes from April-June. Assuming that there were no
significant differences in each year for Part I Crimes, we would expect that there were 14,131
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Part I Crimes per year (42,393/3). In 2014, there were 14,622 Part I Crimes, in 2017, there were
13,846, and in 2019, there were 13,925. There was a significant difference in the total number of
Part I Crimes relative to each year, X2(N = 42,393) = 25.81, p < .001. Chi-square results are
summarized in Table 4.
Table 4
Chi-Square Results for Part I Crimes
Crime
Murder and Non-Negligent Manslaughter
Rape
Aggravated Assault
Auto Theft
Burglary
Robbery
Total

2014
54
228
2,865
3,579
5,573
2,323

2017
69
365
3,855
2,958
4,204
2,395

2019
66
323
3,218
3,562
4,393
2,363

Note. Data are from April-June of each year.

A clustered bar graph of these disparities is illustrated in Figure 1.

X2 Statistic
2.00
45.87
151.99
74.34
233.05
1.10
25.81

Significance
0.368
< .001
< .001
< .001
< .001
0.576
< .001
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Figure 1
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In 2014, there were 0-515 traffic stops by officers (M = 30.22, SD = 50.09) with a median
of 15.00. In 2017, there were 0-857 traffic stops by officers (M = 33.45, SD = 59.55) with a
median of 14.00. In 2019, there were 0-1,105 traffic stops by officers (M = 33.80, SD = 83.26)
with a median of 8.00. In 2014, there were 0-243 self-initiated activities by officers (M = 11.10,
SD = 2.68) with a median of 5.00. In 2017, there were 0-497 self-initiated activities by officers
(M = 16.15, SD = 33.13) with a median of 6.00. In 2019, there were 0-459 self-initiated activities
by officers (M = 15.22, SD = 36.67) with a median of 4.00. Descriptive statistics are presented in
Table 5.
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
N
SD
Median
Minimum
Maximum

Traffic Stops
in 2014
30.22
1455
50.09
15.00
0
515

Traffic Stops
in 2017
33.45
1455
59.55
14.00
0
857

Traffic Stops
in 2019
33.80
1455
83.26
8.00
0
1105

Self-Initiated
2014
11.10
1454
20.68
5.00
0
243

Self-Initiated
2017
16.15
1455
33.13
6.00
0
497

Self-Initiated
2019
15.22
1455
36.67
4.00
0
459

Note. Data are from April-June of each year.

Results
Hypothesis One
Research question one asked, “What is the difference in the number of traffic stops after
BWCs were deployed?” It was initially proposed that a paired samples t-test be used to answer
this research question. However, based on the descriptive statistics, the distributions of values for
traffic stops were not normally distributed. In a normal distribution, the mean and median are
approximately equal. The means and medians were not equal for traffic stops in 2014, 2017, and
2019. Therefore, the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for Medians was more appropriate. The
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test was more appropriate when distributions are skewed. However, for
matched pairs, the distributions must be skewed in the same direction. Distrbution normality can
also be assessed by the skewness and kurtosis statistics. Skewness and kurtosis statistics are
presented in Table 6.
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Table 6
Skewness and Kurtosis Statistics for Traffic Stops

Traffic Stops in 2014
Traffic Stops in 2017
Traffic Stops in 2019

Mean
Statistic
30.22
33.45
33.80

Std. Deviation
Statistic
50.10
59.55
83.26

Skewness
Statistic
4.38
5.77
5.86

Std. Error
.064
.064
.064

Kurtosis
Statistic
26.19
54.51
47.58

Std. Error
0.13
0.13
0.13

The distribution of traffic stops in 2014 was positively skewed. The skewness was 68.44
times the standard error. The kurtosis was 201.46 times the standard error. The histogram of
traffic stops in 2014 is presented in Figure 2.
Figure 2
Histogram of Traffic Stops in 2014
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The distribution of traffic stops in 2017 was positively skewed. The skewness was 90.16
times the standard error. The kurtosis was 419.31 times the standard error. The histogram of
traffic stops in 2017 is presented in Figure 3.
Figure 3
Histogram of Traffic Stops in 2017

The distribution of traffic stops in 2019 was positively skewed. The skewness was 91.56
times the standard error. The kurtosis was 366 times the standard error. The histogram of traffic
stops in 2019 is presented in Figure 4.
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Figure 4
Histogram of Traffic Stops in 2019

Descriptive statistics for the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test are presented in Table 7.
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Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for Research Question One
Traffic Stops in
Negative Ranks
2017 - Traffic Stops Positive Ranks
in 2014
Ties
Total
Traffic Stops in
Negative Ranks
2019 - Traffic Stops Positive Ranks
in 2014
Ties
Total
Traffic Stops in
Negative Ranks
2019 - Traffic Stops Positive Ranks
in 2017
Ties
Total

N
689a
672b
94c
1455
804d
550e
101f
1455
822g
491h
142i
1455

Mean Rank
658.72
703.84

Sum of Ranks
453859.00
472982.00

Median
14.00
15.00

674.72
681.56

542476.00
374859.00

8.00
15.00

665.73
642.39

547226.50
315414.50

8.00
14.00

a. Traffic Stops in 2017 < Traffic Stops in 2014
b. Traffic Stops in 2017 > Traffic Stops in 2014
c. Traffic Stops in 2017 = Traffic Stops in 2014
d. Traffic Stops in 2019 < Traffic Stops in 2014
e. Traffic Stops in 2019 > Traffic Stops in 2014
f. Traffic Stops in 2019 = Traffic Stops in 2014
g. Traffic Stops in 2019 < Traffic Stops in 2017
h. Traffic Stops in 2019 > Traffic Stops in 2017
i. Traffic Stops in 2019 = Traffic Stops in 2017

Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test results for Research Question One are presented in Table 8.
Table 8
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Tests for Research Question One
Traffic Stops in 2017 Traffic Stops in 2014
Z
-0.66b
Asymp. Sig. (2- .510
tailed)

Traffic Stops in 2019 Traffic Stops in 2014
-5.82c
.000

Traffic Stops in 2019 Traffic Stops in 2017
-8.44c
.000

a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
b. Based on negative ranks.
c. Based on positive ranks.

There was no significant difference in the median traffic stops in 2014 (15.00) and 2017
(14.00), Z = -0.66, p = .510. However, there was a significant difference in median traffic stops
in 2019 (8.00) and 2014 (15.00), Z = -5.82, p < .001. There was also a significant difference in
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median traffic stops in 2019 (8.00) and 2017 (14.00), Z = -8.44, p < .001. This is illustrated in
Figure 5.
Figure 5
Median Traffic Stops in 2014, 2017, and 2019

H01 stated that there is no statistically significant difference in the number of traffic stops
conducted by first-line patrol officers after implementing BWCs. Three paired samples Wilcoxon
Signed Ranks Test for Medians were conducted. One was not significant (p = .510) and two were
significant (p < .001). Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected. Median traffic stops did not
differ significantly between 2014 and 2017. However, median traffic stops decreased
significantly between 2014 and 2019 and between 2017 and 2019.
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Hypothesis Two
Research Question Two asked, “What is the difference in the number of self-initiated
activities after BWCs were deployed?” It was initially proposed that a paired samples t-test be
used to answer this research question. However, based on the descriptive statistics, the
distributions of values for self-initiated activities were not normally distributed. In a normal
distribution, the mean and median are approximately equal. The means and medians were not
equal for self-initiated activities in 2014, 2017, and 2019. Therefore, the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks
Test for Medians was more appropriate. The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test is appropriate when
distributions are skewed. However, for matched pairs, the distributions must be skewed in the
same direction. Distribution normality can also be assessed by the skewness and kurtosis
statistics. Distributions are normal when the absolute values of their skewness and kurtosis
statisics is less than 2 times their standard errors. Skewness and kurtosis statistics are presented
in Table 9.
Table 9
Skewness and Kurtosis Statistics for Self-Initiated Activities

Self-Initiated 2014
Self-Initiated 2017
Self-Initiated 2019

Mean
Statistic
11.10
16.15
15.22

Std. Deviation
Statistic
20.68
33.13
36.67

Skewness
Statistic
5.01
6.20
5.03

Std. Error
0.06
0.06
0.06

Kurtosis
Statistic
34.68
60.03
33.12

Std. Error
0.13
0.13
0.13

The distribution of self-initiatiated activities in 2014 was positively skewed. The
skewness was 83.50 times the standard error. The kurtosis was 266.77 times the standard error.
The histogram of self-initiated activities in 2014 is presented in Figure 6.
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Figure 6
Histogram of Self-Initiated Activities in 2014

The distribution of self-initiatiated activities in 2017 was positively skewed. The
skewness was 103.33 times the standard error. The kurtosis was 461.77 times the standard error.
The histogram of self-initiated activities in 2017 is presented in Figure 7.
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Figure 7
Histogram of Self-Initiated Activities in 2017

The distribution of self-initiatiated activities in 2019 was positively skewed. The
skewness was 83.83 times the standard error. The kurtosis was 254.77 times the standard error.
The histogram of self-initiated activities in 2019 is presented in Figure 8.
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Figure 8
Histogram of Self-Initiated Activities in 2019

Descriptive statistics for the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test are presented in Table 10.
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Table 10
Descriptive Statistics for Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for Research Question Two
Self-Initiated 2017 - Negative Ranks
Self-Initiated 2014 Positive Ranks
Ties
Total
Self-Initiated 2019 - Negative Ranks
Self-Initiated 2014 Positive Ranks
Ties
Total
Self-Initiated 2019 - Negative Ranks
Self-Initiated 2017 Positive Ranks
Ties
Total

N
576a
732b
146c
1454
667d
627e
160f
1454
754g
492h
209i
1455

Mean Rank
601.06
696.55

Sum of Ranks
346209.00
509877.00

Median
6
5

625.27
671.15

417052.00
420813.00

4
5

627.87
616.80

473417.00
303464.00

4
6

a. Self-Initiated 2017 < Self-Initiated 2014
b. Self-Initiated 2017 > Self-Initiated 2014
c. Self-Initiated 2017 = Self-Initiated 2014
d. Self-Initiated 2019 < Self-Initiated 2014
e. Self-Initiated 2019 > Self-Initiated 2014
f. Self-Initiated 2019 = Self-Initiated 2014
g. Self-Initiated 2019 < Self-Initiated 2017
h. Self-Initiated 2019 > Self-Initiated 2017
i. Self-Initiated 2019 = Self-Initiated 2017

Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test results for Research Question Two are presented in Table 11.
Table 11
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Tests for Research Question Two
Z
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed)

Self-Initiated 2017 Self-Initiated 2014
-5.99b
.000

Self-Initiated 2019 Self-Initiated 2014
-0.14b
.889

Self-Initiated 2019 Self-Initiated 2017
-6.69c
.000

a. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
b. Based on negative ranks.
c. Based on positive ranks.

There was a significant difference in the median self-initiated activities in 2014 (5.00)
and 2017 (6.00), Z = -5.99, p < .001. However, there was no significant difference in median
self-initiated activities in 2019 (4.00) and 2014 (5.00), Z = -0.14, p = .889. There was also a
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significant difference in self-initiated activities in 2019 (4.00) and 2017 (6.00), Z = -6.69, p <
.001. This is illustrated in Figure 9.
Figure 9
Median Self-Initiated Activities in 2014, 2017, and 2019

H02 stated that there is no statistically significant difference in the number of selfinitiated patrol activities conducted by first-line patrol officers after implementing BWCs. Three
paired samples Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for Medians were conducted. One was not
significant (p = .889) and two were significant (p < .001). Therefore, the null hypothesis was
rejected. Median self-initiated patrol activities increased significantly between 2014 and 2017.
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However, median self-initiated patrol activities did not decrease significantly between 2014 and
2019 but did decrease significantly between 2017 and 2019.
Hypothesis Three
Research Question Three asked, “What is the relationship between traffic stops and the
Part I crime rate before and after BWCs were deployed?” It was initially proposed that this
research question be answered with the Pearson rho. However, research Question Three could
not be tested with the data. The total number of crimes were provided for a specified timeframe
for each corresponding year. However, this number was a constant and therefore, it did not
change. In other words, if the total crimes reported for 2014 was 14,622 between April and June
of that year, that value was the same for each patrol officer case entry and did not vary.
Hypothesis Four
Research Question Four asked, “What is the relationship between officer self-initiated
activities and the Part I crime rate before and after BWCs were deployed?” It was initially
proposed that this research question be answered with the Pearson rho. However, research
Question Three could not be tested with the data. The total number of crimes were provided for a
specified timeframe for each corresponding year. However, this number was a constant and
therefore, it did not change. In other words, if the total crimes reported for 2014 was 14,622
between April and June of that year, that value was the same for each patrol officer case entry
and did not vary.
Hypothesis Five
Research Question Five asked, “What is the relationship between the number of officer
proactive initiatives and their career progression?” This research question was tested with the
Spearman’s rho correlation. The predictor variable was the officer’s career progression as
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measured by their tenure range in 2014 and 2019. Officer tenure was an ordinal variable with
five levels (0-5 years, 6-10 years, 11-15 years, 16-20 years, and 21 or more years). The criterion
variable was proactive initiatives. The variable, proactive initiatives, was computed by adding
the number of traffic stops to the number of self-initiated patrol activities for two years (2014,
2019). A correlation matrix for Research Question Five is presented in Table 12.
Table 12
Spearman’s Rho Correlation Matrix
Officer's
Officer's
Proactive
Tenure Range Tenure Range Initiatives in
2014
2019
2014
Officer's
Tenure Range
2014
Officer's
Tenure Range
2019
Proactive
Initiatives in
2014
Proactive
Initiatives in
2019

Proactive
Initiatives in
2019

n

M

SD

1454
__
1454
***

.985

__

-.203***

-.147***

***

***

1455 41.43 63.28
__
1455 49.02 107.43
-.117

-.121

.289

***

__

Note. ***p < .001, two-tailed.

There was a weak, but significant, negative relationship between the officer’s career
progression in 2014 and their proactive initiatives in 2014, rrho (1452) = -.20, p < .001, two tailed.
As career progression increased in 2014, proactive initiatives decreased in 2014. There was also
a weak, but significant, negative relationship between the officer’s career progression in 2019
and their proactive initiatives in 2019, rrho (1452) = -.12, p < .001, two tailed. As career
progression increased in 2019, proactive initiatives decreased in 2019.
H05 stated that there is no statistically significant relationship between the number of
officer proactive initiatives and their career progression. There was a weak, but significant,
negative relationship between the officer’s career progression in 2014 and their proactive
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initiatives in 2014, rrho (1452) = -.20, p < .001, two tailed. There was also a weak, but significant,
negative relationship between the officer’s career progression in 2019 and their proactive
initiatives in 2019, rrho (1452) = -.12, p < .001, two tailed. Therefore, the null hypothesis was
rejected. Hypotheses and outcomes are summarized in Table 13.
Table 13
Hypothesis Summary and Outcomes
Hypothesis

Statistical Test

Significance Supported or
Not Supported

H1: There is a statistically significant difference in
the number of traffic stops conducted by patrol
officers after implementing BWCs.

Wilcoxon
Signed Ranks
Test

p < .001

Supported

H2: There is a statistically significant difference in
the number of self-initiated patrol activities
conducted by patrol officers after implementing
BWCs.

Wilcoxon
Signed Ranks
Test

p < .001

Supported

H3: There is a significant correlation between the
volume of traffic stops and the crime rate.

Unable to Test

N/A

N/A

H4: There is a significant correlation between the
volume of self-initiated patrol activities and the
crime rate

Unable to Test

N/A

N/A

H5: There is a statistically significant relationship
between the number of officer proactive initiatives
and their career progression.

Spearman’s Rho p < .001

Supported

Summary
The purpose of this study was to determine if officer proactive initiatives, specifically
traffic stops and self-initiated activities, have declined significantly since the deployment of body
worn cameras (BWCs) using data from a large, metropolitan police agency in the Southern
United States that services more than one million citizens. There was a significant difference in
the total number of Part I Crimes relative to each year in question (2017, 2018, and 2019). There
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was an overall decrease in the number of reported crimes from 2014 to 2017, however, crimes
remained relatively static from 2017 to 2019. There was no significant difference in murders and
non-negligent manslaughters. There was a significant difference in the number of reported rapes
relative to each year. The number of rapes reported increased from 2014 to 2017 but remained
relatively constant between 2017 and 2019. There was a significant difference in the number of
aggravated assaults relative to each year. Aggravated assaults increased from 2014 to 2017 but
decreased from 2017 to 2019. There was a significant difference in the number of auto thefts
relative to each year. Reported auto thefts decreased from 2014 to 2017 but increased from to the
2014 level in 2019. There was a significant difference in the number of burglaries relative to
each year. Burglaries decreased from 2014 to 2017 and increased slightly from 2017 to 2019.
However, there was no significant difference in the number of robberies reported relative to each
year.
Research Question One
Five research questions and associated hypotheses were formulated for investigation. It
was determined that there was no significant difference in the median traffic stops in 2014
(15.00) and 2017 (14.00). However, there was a significant difference in median traffic stops in
2019 (8.00) and 2014 (15.00). There was also a significant difference in median traffic stops in
2019 (8.00) and 2017 (14.00).
Research Question Two
There was a significant difference in the median self-initiated activities in 2014 (5.00)
and 2017 (6.00). However, there was no significant difference in median self-initiated activities
in 2019 (4.00) and 2014 (5.00). There was also a significant difference in self-initiated activities
in 2019 (4.00) and 2017 (6.00).
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Research Questions Three and Four
Research Questions Three and Four could not be tested due to the nature of the data and
the conceptualization of the research questions and required analyses.
Research Question Five
There was a weak, but significant, negative relationship between the officer’s career
progression and their proactive initiatives. As career progression increased proactive initiatives
decreased. This was consistent throughout the three aforementioned time periods. Implications
and recommendations will be discussed in Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
Overview
Since the officer-involved shooting death of Michael Brown in 2014 and several other
high-profile cases that have made nationwide media headlines, many police agencies across the
nation have adopted BWCs as a tool to reduce police use of force, reduce citizen complaints, and
to be more transparent to the public (Schneider, 2018). This call to action came as a result of
President Obama’s Task Force that was assembled in December 2014 (President’s Task Force on
21st Century Policing, 2015). Though there are numerous studies that have been conducted on
BWCs since their inception, most of the studies focus on citizen complaints, citizen perspective,
and officer’s perception (Lum et al., 2019). While there are very few studies in which officer
proactive initiatives are evaluated, these studies do not include agencies comparable in size to the
agency used in this study. This study evaluated proactive initiatives for 1,455 officers. This
study sought to contribute to the body of knowledge and narrow the gap in existing research.
Chapter five is organized by a discussion of each research question, implications of the study,
limitations, and recommendations for future research.
Discussion
The purpose of this quantitative study was to determine if officer proactive initiatives,
specifically traffic stops and self-initiated activities, declined significantly since the deployment
of BWCs and if this played a roll in the crime rate. The OIS concerning Michael Brown and
Officer Darren Wilson sparked national concern in 2014 and furthered the debate over the use
and deployment of BWCs. This OIS incident spurred what many call the “Ferguson Effect”. The
“Ferguson Effect” is a rise in the crime rates, consequently in part to the alleged lack of proactive
police efforts throughout communities (MacDonald, 2019). The phrase, “Ferguson Effect,” was
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first proposed by Ferguson, Missouri’s police chief, Sam Dotson when discussing the rise in
violent crimes and the decrease in the number of arrests made by his officers (Gonzales &
Cochran, 2017). This study found a significant decrease in proactive initiatives for patrol officers
after BWCs were deployed. However, it was undetermined if this decrease had any affect on the
crime rate. Each research question will be discussed in light of the results, the theory behind the
results, and the corresponding literature.
Research question one asked, “What is the difference in the number of traffic stops after
BWCs were deployed?” The results showed the median number of traffic stops, by first-line
patrol officers, began to decline shortly after BWCs were implemented, but this was not
signficant. However, there was a significant decrease in the number of traffic stops conducted
during the same time period two years after the cameras were fully employed by first-line
officers. Mentioned previously, studies on BWCs have only begun to increase in recent years,
and there are very few studies specifically analyzing BWCs and traffic stops (Lawrence et al.,
2020). Lum et al. (2019) published a study in February 2019 analyzing nearly 70 research
studies pertaining to various BWCs matters. They found six of the studies focused on BWCs and
officer proactive initiatives with indeterminate results, however, only two of the 70 studies
specifically addressed traffic stops and BWCs. The first was conducted by Headley et al. (2017)
and the second by Lawrence et al. Lum et al. concluded the authors of one study to claim there
was “no significant impact of BWCs on the levels of traffic stops by officers” (p. 102). This is in
contrast to what this researcher uncovered during this study.
The studies conducted by Headley et al. (2017) and Lawrence et al. (2020) analyzed 51
and 504 officers respectively. The study conducted by Headley et al. analyzed a variety of
concerns and grouped traffic stops within the field contacts category which saw no significant
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difference pre and post BWCs. The other categories included the number of arrests made,
complaints, citations, assaults on officers, non-violent resistance, and use of force incidents.
Although their consensus leaned favorably towards BWCs, this was in part to the totality of all
areas researched. Again, traffic stops were grouped together with field contacts. Even though
there was an increase in field contacts for officers who were equipped with BWCs the results
were not significant, and the same held true for number of citations issued in the study by
Headley et al.
The research conducted by Lawrence et al. (2020) did separate out traffic stops from
other officer proactive initiatives. They found that traffic stops increased ever so slightly for
both the treatment and control groups after BWCs were issued, but the increase was not
significant. These authors utilized a randomized control study where one group was issued a
camera while the control group was without a camera. They mentioned the results may have
been somewhat skewed since some officers riding together were not both equipped with a
camera, but they did not believe this to be significant.
Body-worn cameras were founded on the deterrence theory and this theory is also the
foundation behind crime and punishment (Ariel et al., 2017). Deterrence theory rationalizes that
if a particular action has a high propensity of producing an undesirable consequence, and that
consequence has the likelihood of being promptly imposed, then rational individuals are likely to
be disinclined to avoid the repercussions (Lee, 2017). Moreover, the feeling of fear has been
hypothesized as a critical component of deterrence (Pickett et al., 2018). These authors explain
that fear is an emotion people experience when visualizing danger which causes them to be
reluctant or hesitant when considering an action. Additionally, they say fear causes anxiety
because the individual recognizes there are consequences that could be incurred.
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This current study analyzed 1,455 first-line patrol officers and found that traffic stops
significantly decreased within two years after BWCs were issued. It is reasonable to believe
these observed changes are, in part, a result of BWCs as the cameras could be deterring officers
from initiating traffic stops due to fear. Deterrence theory has been used to explain why officers
curtail proactive initiatives which is to shirk the adverse consequences that can accompany them
(Demir et al., 2020).
Research shows that traffic stops enhance the safety of the public by reducing unsafe
driving practices and other crimes (Fliss et al., 2020). Wallace et al. (2018) believes that public
scrutiny has increased since BWCs and this has led officers to pull back in proactive initiatives
such as traffic stops. This author further stated the former Director of the FBI, James Comey,
agrees and has publicly stated that officers have reduced their proactivity to prevent being the
next viral video. Futhermore, the video footage from the BWCs can be viewed by others
including supervisors, the public, and the media making officers less enthusiastic to proactively
make contact with citizens because it can result in discipline, demotion, public disgust, or injury
(Lawrence et al., 2020; Shjarback et al., 2017; Wallace et al., 2018).
Research question two asked, “What is the difference in the number of self-initiated
activities after BWCs were deployed?” The results showed the median number of self-initiated
activities, by first-line patrol officers, increased shortly after BWCs were implemented, and the
increase was found to be signficant. However, there was a significant decrease in the number of
self-initiated activities during the same time period two years (2019) after the cameras were fully
employed. It would be reasonable to believe the same factors deterring officers in conducting
traffic stops are the same when making voluntary contact with citizens. Lawrence et al. (2020)
states their “results suggest that BWC-wearing officers may be less likely to engage in proactive
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activities that are highly discretionary and that could potentially lead to confrontations with
community members” (p. 481).
Moreover, BWCs were rolled out without much examination (Smith, 2019). The cameras
have been found to have some unintended consequences. These adverse effects range from an
increase in officers using force, an increase in assaults and ambushes on police officers, officer
burnout, curtailed self-initiated activity, and in some cities, there has been an uptick in the
violent crime rate and a decrease in arrests (Campbell et al., 2017; Lum et al., 2017; Wright &
Headley, 2021). Although there is no hard evidence to suggest BWCs are solely responsible for
these adverse events, many scholars believe the cameras contribute to it (Adams & Mastracci,
2019; Braga et al., 2020; Lum et al., 2019).
In 2013, 11,500 police agencies reported more than 49,800 assaults on police officers
(U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2014). Most police agencies were
not equipped with BWCs at this time. In 2019, 2,000 fewer agencies than in 2013, reported
assaults that occurred on police officers to the FBI (Sierra-Arevalo & Nix, 2020; U.S.
Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2020). Even though there was a
significant drop in reporting agencies, the U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of
Investigation, reports the number of officers assaulted soared to more than 56,000 in 2019. There
are numerous studies that suggest BWCs may be a contributing factor in the increase in assaults
on police officers due to hesitation, fear of discipline, or because officers feel they lack
discretion (Ariel et al., 2016; Campbell et al., 2017). Some early studies have suggested that
police officers, who are equipped with a camera versus those who are not, are coming under fire
more often and are being assaulted while attempting an arrest (Maguire et al., 2017; Moule,
2020).
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This suggests that the social learning theory and self-awareness theory, two other theories
used to frame this study, may be correlated to the officer’s reduction in proactive initiatives.
Albert Bandura’s social learning theory suggests that individuals learn by observing and
imitating the behavior of others (Mayes, 2015). Mayes believes, these observers (the officers)
determine if a particular behavior results in positive or negative consequences. Furthermore, he
espouses positive consequences will often encourage or promote a particular behavior while
negative consequences customarily desist or discourage an individual from engaging in the
observed behavior. The widespread anti-police sentiment conveyed in the media and
demonstrated by various groups such as Black Lives Matter, Campaign Zero, and other social
justice groups place officers in fear of generating discipline that could negatively impact their
employment or family life (Maguire et al., 2017).
Equally, self-awareness is a psychosocial occurrence that regulates an individual’s
behavior (Ariel et al., 2018). First evaluated by George Mead in the 1930’s, a person becomes
conscientious of their behavior when they are aware their behavior may not reflect social norms
(Wicklund & Duval, 1971). Self-awareness theory operates in conjunction with the deterrence
theory, in that should undesirable behavior be discovered, fear of consequences shall follow, thus
reducing the undesirable behavior. The premise behind BWCs is to improve the behavior of
police and citizens alike because one’s self-awareness would be heightened knowing a camera is
recording, thus deterring poor behavior from either party (Groff et al., 2020; Hughes et al.,
2020). Therefore, for police officers, BWCs deliver that constraint on an amplified level in that
not only is someone witnessing the performance and conduct, but that the scrutinizing entity will
penalize those for wrongdoings (Berg et al., 2016; Hedberg et al., 2017).
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The likelihood for intensified scrutiny by police administrators and the public may be
causing first-line officers to withdraw from proactive initiatives such as traffic stops and other
self-initiated activities (Groff et al., 2020). In other words, they say the officers will continue to
answer calls for service, but they will drastically reduce the number of times they seek out
interactions with citizens. These authors declare this newly adopted tactic of disengagement
suggests that officers need to abate the risk of punishment, public examination, and their own
injury or death, should they lack self-restraint in language or physical force situations.
A study conducted by Groff et al. (2020), confirmed the presumption that the cameras
worn by officers elevate one’s self-awareness, driving officers to pull back from proactive
activities. As a result, BWCs may be triggering a heightened inspection of oneself that is so great
that it creates an “over-deterrence” effect in police officers (Ariel et al., 2018). This surplus of
deterrence can be a contributing factor for why some officers are more hesitant to carry out
proactive initiatives. Ariel et al., also discovered this “over-deterrence” has resulted in officers
being more cautious in using justified force, which in turn results in more assaults on the
officers. Moreover, they suggest that instead of the officers using the necessary force to restrain
combative individuals, some officers are discouraged to use any force, fearing potential
discipline, as it may be construed as inappropriate. They believe this phenomenon illustrates a
grim side of self-awareness that was unpredicted and has been under researched.
Research question three asked, “What is the relationship between traffic stops and the
Part I crime rate before and after BWCs were deployed?” There is clearly a lack of research that
analyzes the relationship between BWCs and crime rates (Wright & Headley, 2021). This
question could not be tested with the acquired data. The total number of crimes provided for a
specified timeframe for each corresponding year were constant and therefore, did not change. A
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relationship between the number of traffic stops conducted and Part I crimes (crimes considered
to be the most violent) before and after BWCs could not be determined. However, after
analyzing the summary of Part I crimes from the agency this area services there was a 5.3%
decrease in overall Part I crimes in 2017 (after BWCs) when compared to 2014 (before BWCs).
Part I crimes did begin to increase slightly in 2019, with a mere 0.56% increase over 2017.
Research question four asked, “What is the relationship between self-initiated activities
and the Part I crime rate before and after BWCs were deployed?” Again, this question could not
be tested with the acquired data. A relationship between the number of self-initiated activities
and Part I crimes before and after BWCs could not be determined. In 2015, the nation’s violent
crime rate had dropped nearly 76% when compared to twenty years prior, however, in 2015,
agencies were beginning to see a statistically significant increase in crime (Morgan &
Ouderkerk, 2019). Likewise, they state that by 2018, there had been nearly 600,000 more people
victimized in the U.S. than years prior to 2015. They say this equates to a 28% nationwide
increase in violent victimizations in just three years. Pyrooz et al. (2016), states studies that
investigate de-policing and crime have mixed results and de-policing, overall, is difficult to
measure due to mixed methods and inconsistent analyses. However, they suggest that if
guardianship is reduced (officers de-policing) this may trigger an increase in crime. Again, Part I
crime rates dropped for the area in this study which goes against the nationwide spike in crime.
Nonetheless, stakeholders, politicians, and other observers are now coming forward after
noticing the overall spike in crime, from coast-to-coast, and speculating the trend may coincide
with an increase in de-policing (Rosenfeld & Wallman, 2019). They describe de-policing as
officers pulling back from their duties, unwilling to proactively engage individuals out of fear of
legal or disciplinary repercussions. They also say that stakeholders and politicians should
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seriously examine de-policing as a reason why homicide rates in the U.S. escalated sharply in
2015, after declining uninterruptedly for more than twenty years. These authors state the
“Ferguson Effect” has been blamed for this increase across the country. They espouse the media
latched on to the phrase “Ferguson Effect” as a way of suggesting that police officers have
separated themselves from proactive law enforcement out of fear of elevated legal liability or
exposure to scrutiny on social or conventional media outlets. Moreover, they stated the media
promoted this idea by suggesting that officers disengaging from proactive enforcement activities
is a direct cause to the increase in crime. Maguire et al. (2017), contend that scholars are
discovering that officers work in fear of discipline, in fear of losing their jobs or pensions, and in
fear of being prosecuted or sued. Recall, Pickett et al. (2018) stated the feeling of fear has been
hypothesized as a critical component of deterrence. Furthermore, it has been discovered that
officers are hesitating to react or actively shying away from taking police action which is putting
the officers at significant risk of harm (Ariel et al., 2018). Officials have attributed the
nationwide spike in crime to emboldened criminals and media scrutiny of the police (Gonzales &
Cochran, 2017).
Research question five asked, “What is the relationship between the number of officer
proactive initiatives and their career progression?” The career-stage theory, which was first
proposed by Donald Super in 1957, posits that work activity levels naturally decline throughout a
person’s career which may support the explanation as to why some officers curtail their proactive
initiatives as their career progresses over time (Bonkiewicz, 2017; Johnson & Lafrance, 2016).
The career-stage theory hypothesizes that as officers progress through their career they may
modify their activity level (avoiding proactive initiatives) to preserve their career (Shjarback et
al., 2017). Johnson and Lafrance (2016), have stated little analysis have been conducted, in the
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criminal justice field, to prove a correlation between an officer’s behavior and their career
progression.
This study showed a weak, but significant, negative relationship between the officer’s
career progression and their proactive initiatives. As the officer’s career progressed over time
their proactive initiatives decreased. This was consistent throughout the three aforementioned
time periods. However, there was a dramatic decrease in officer proactivity in 2019, two years
after BWCs were employed, therefore, even though the career-stage theory was supported, it
appears the BWCs accelerated the officer’s unwillingness to be proactive.
The phases of the career-stage theory are represented in 5-year increments with the first
phase being the exploration phase where the individual is anxious in learning new processes and
the basis that forms their career (Johnson & Lafrance, 2016). They state the second phase, the
establishment phase, is about polishing skills and fortifying the individual’s career. These
scholars believe phase three is where the individual strives to hold on to their reputation, rank,
and other achievements while the last phase shows that work interests and productivity levels
severely decrease.
Implications
This quantitative study analyzed traffic stops and officer self-initiated activity before and
after BWCs were issued to determine if initiatives decreased after the cameras were
implemented. The study attempted to examine how the officer’s proactive initiatives effected the
crime rate. It was found that traffic stops began to decrease significantly after BWCs were
deployed in early 2017, with traffic stops decreasing considerably by 2019 as presented in RQ1
Figure 5. Officer self-initiated activities also began to decline shortly after the BWCs were
issued in 2017 as shown in RQ2 Figure 9. However, even though a relationship between BWCs
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and the crime rate could not be established, select Part 1 crime rates decreased while others
remained static after BWCs were implemented as shown in Figure 1.
This researcher is hopeful this study will assist law enforcement agencies in having a
better understanding of the implications and effects that BWCs can have on their officers and
their communities. Numerous studies have touted the positive contributions BWCs have been
able to make regarding use of force incidents and citizen complaints. However, this newly
adopted technology does have some negative drawbacks that should not be overlooked. Oliver
(2017), believes the BWCs may reduce police-citizen relationships, breakdown trust with
community members, lost revenue, and an increase in crime. Additionally, if officers are being
assaulted more often due to their hesitation to use force (due to scrutiny) this may inhibit others
from joining police departments. Police agencies need to find a balance that is beneficial to the
community and the police officer.
Limitations
The first limitation of this study is the various activities that first-line patrol officers may
deem as a self-initiated activity and how the activity is coded in CAD. In this agency, selfinitiated activity is usually when an officer on-views something that they feel needs addressing
(traffic hazard, suspicious person, business check) or they are flagged down by a citizen
concerning an issue. The officer can have the dispatcher recode the call to reflect the
corresponding offense. For example, if an officer is flagged down by a citizen, who just found
their vehicle had been burglarized, the call is initially coded as a self-initiated call, but the officer
(at their discretion) can have the dispatcher recode the call to a “burglary of a motor vehicle”
once the officer determines what offense has occurred. This also holds true for traffic stops. An
officer may initiate a traffic stop which pulls a distinct code in CAD, but depending on the
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outcome of the traffic stop the call may be recoded to “driving while intoxicated” once the
officer makes contact with the driver of the vehicle and makes the determination the driver is
impaired.
The second limitation is the number of policy changes this agency has made to their
camera policy. The agency made 11 changes to the policy on BWCs beginning in January 2017June 2019. These changes were not minute and several policies were rewritten for clarification.
This indecisiveness from leadership may cause officers to withdraw or pull back from proactive
initiatives because they are unsure of the most current policy. Hot spot policing, traffic stops, and
the stop-question-frisk tactic have proven to be hard-hitting approaches at addressing low-level
crimes to avert more serious crimes (Schuck, 2020). Establishing a clear policy that is reasonable
and clearly written may put officers at ease and therefore increase proactive policing, thus reduce
violent crime.
This study assessed traffic stops and self-initiated activities using archived data from
1,455 first-line patrol officers from a large agency who services more than one million citizens in
the Southern United States. Other studies that have analyzed similar data collected data over time
as the BWCs were rolled out. Ariel et al. (2021) believes these types of studies are contaminated
in that the officers knew the testing was being conducted and therefore altered their behavior for
more favorable results. They say these officers “have already seen the gorilla” (p. 60). In other
words, officers knew the intended outcome was to show more favorable actions, so they
knowingly modified their behavior. The data used in this study was archived data. The officers,
included in this study, were unaware this research would take place and therefore this researcher
believes the data to be more genuine.
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Recommendations for Future Research
The first recommendation for future research is to evaluate other agencies of equal size
and demographics exclusively analyzing officer proactivity before and after BWCs. Traffic stops
and specific self-initiated activities need to be examined and not lumped together with other
police activities. Gathering data from the CAD that shows how the police-citizen interaction was
initiated would be a better indicator of proactive initiatives. The second recommendation would
be to conduct a qualitative analysis using the same sample of officers to explore the reasoning
behind the decrease in officer proactivity. Exploring Albert Bandura’s social learning theory and
Mead’s self-awareness theory may shed light on reasons why officers are pulling back. This
could give leadership insight that would help facilitate officer training and formulating policy.
Conclusion
This study sought to discover if there was a reduction in officer proactive initiatives
(traffic stops and self-initiative activities) after body-worn cameras were issued. Additionally,
this study attempted to determine if there were correlations to officer proactive initiatives and the
crime rate. Archived data for first-line patrol officers was collected prior to and after BWCs were
implemented for a comparison. The analysis revealed that traffic stops declined after the BWCs
were issued in 2017. However, traffic stops declined significantly in the two years following the
deployment of BWCs, in 2019. Officer self-initiated activities increased slightly in 2017 after all
first-line patrol officers were equipped with the BWCs, but decreased significantly in 2019, just
two years following the issuance of the cameras. Due to the manner in which the overall Part I
crime data was retrieved, it was undetermined if the BWCs had any effect on the crime rate. The
overall Part I crime rate declined in 2017 with 776 less Part I crimes reported than in 2014.
However, Part I crimes were starting to climb back up in 2019 with a slight increase. In 2019,
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murder, rape, aggravated assaults, and robberies were down when compared with 2017 totals.
The increase in 2019 was due to auto thefts and burglaries. Implications from this study should
be of concern for police leaders and citizens as community safety should be at the forefront. This
researcher hopes the results from this study will encourage police leaders to look carefully at
their body-worn camera policies to ensure they are not deterring officers from carrying out their
duties.
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